

Code :PL/SMI/16 Version : 02 Date : 30/04/2019

Page : 1 / 71 CL: PU

## TunTrust PKI

Certificate Policy / Certification Practice Statement

Agence Nationale de Certification Electronique

	Author	Validated by	Approved by
Entity:	TunTrust	Steering comity of Integrated  Management System	TunTrust Board of Directors
Date :	26/04/2019	29/04/2019	29/04/2019



Code :PL/SMI/16 Version : 02 Date : 30/04/2019

Page : 2 / 71 CL: PU

1		INTRODUCTION	5
	1.1	Overview	5
	1.2	Document Name and identification	5
	1.3	PKI Participants	6
	1.4	Certificate Usage	7
	1.5	Policy Administration	8
	1.6	Definitions and Acronyms	9
2		Publication and Repository Responsibilities	15
	2.1	Repositories	15
	2.2	Publication of Certification Information	16
	2.3	Time or Frequency of Publication	16
	2.4	Access controls on repositories	16
3		Identification and Authentication	16
	3.1	Naming	16
	3.2	Initial Identity Validation	17
	3.3	Identification and authentication for re-key requests	23
	3.4	Identification and authentication for revocation request	23
4		Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements	23
	4.1	Certificate application	23
	4.2	Certificate Application Processing	24
	4.3	Certificate Issuance	25
	4.4	Certificate Acceptance	25
	4.5	Key pair and Certificate usage	26
	4.6	Certificate renewal	26
	4.7	Certificate Re-Key	27
	4.8	Certificate Modification	28
	4.9	Certificate Revocation and suspension	28
	4.10	Certificate Status Services	33
	4.11	End of Subscription	33
	4.12	Key Escrow and recovery	33
5		Facility, Management, and operational controls	34
	5.1	Physical controls	34



Code :PL/SMI/16 Version : 02 Date : 30/04/2019

Page : 3 / 71 CL: PU

5.2	2 Procedural Controls	35
5.3	Personnel controls	37
5.4	4 Audit Logging Procedures	39
5.5	5 Records archival	40
5.6	S Key changeover	41
5.7	7 Compromise and disaster recovery	41
5.8	3 CA or RA Termination	43
5	Technical Security Controls	43
6.1	L Key pair generation and installation	43
6.2	Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering Controls	45
6.3	Other aspects of key pair management	47
6.4	4 Activation data	48
6.5	5 Computer security controls	48
6.6	5 Life cycle technical controls	49
6.7	7 Network security controls	50
6.8	3 Time-Stamping	50
7	Certificate profile	50
7.1	L Certificate Profile	51
7.2	2 CRL profile	52
7.3	3 OCSP profile	52
3	Compliance Audit and Other Assessments	53
8.1	I Frequency or circumstances of assessment	53
8.2	2 Identity/qualifications of assessor	53
8.3	Assessor's relationship to assessed entity	54
8.4	1 Topics covered by assessment	54
8.5	Actions taken as a result of deficiency	54
8.6		
	6 Communication of results	54
8.7		
8.7 9		54
_	7 Self-Audits Other Business and Legal Matters	54 54
9	7 Self-Audits Other Business and Legal Matters	54 54 55



Code :PL/SMI/16 Version : 02 Date : 30/04/2019

Page : 4 / 71 CL: PU

	9.4	Privacy of personal information	56
	9.5	Intellectual property rights	57
	9.6	Representations and warranties	57
	9.7	Disclaimers of warranties	60
	9.8	Limitations of Liability	61
	9.9	Indemnities	61
	9.10	Term and termination	62
	9.11	Individual notices and communications with participants	62
	9.12	Amendments	62
	9.13	Dispute resolution provisions	62
	9.14	Governing law	63
	9.15	Compliance with applicable law	63
	9.16	Miscellaneous provisions	63
	9.17	Other provisions	64
4	ppendix	A	65
4	ppendix	В	68
Δ.	nnendix	C	70



Code :PL/SMI/16 Version : 02 Date : 30/04/2019

Page : 5 / 71 CL: PU

## 1 INTRODUCTION

## 1.1 OVERVIEW

The Agence Nationale de Certification Electronique was founded in accordance with Law no. 2000-83 of 9 August 2000 governing electronic exchanges and commerce in Tunisia. The Agence Nationale de Certification Electronique is a government-owned Certificate Authority (CA) and will be referred to in the remainder of this document with its trademark name "TunTrust".

In this document, the words "TunTrust" and "TunTrust CA" and "TunTrust PKI" are used interchangeably and include TunTrust Root CAs and Issuing CAs of the Agence Nationale de Certification Electronique.

Referred as Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement (CP/CPS), this document has been prepared in compliance with the guide book of "IETF RFC 3647 Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Policy and Certification Practices Framework" for the purpose of describing how TunTrust executes its operations during providing OV SSL (Organization Validated SSL) certificate to domain names restricted by the ".tn" top-level domain for Tunisia and owned by entities operating under the Tunisian Jurisdiction.

TunTrust conforms to the current version of the Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates published at http://www.cabforum.org. In the event of any inconsistency between this document and those Requirements, those Requirements take precedence over this document.

This CP/CPS document describes the execution of the services in regard to accepting Certificate applications, Certificate issuance and management, and Certificate revocation procedures in compliance with administrative, technical and legal requirements.

This CP/CPS also determines practice responsibilities and obligations of TunTrust, applicants, subscribers and relying parties that use or rely on Certificates issued by TunTrust.

Pursuant to the IETF PKIX RFC 3647 CP/CPS framework, this CP/CPS is divided into nine parts that cover the security controls and practices and procedures for Certificate services operated by TunTrust. To preserve the outline specified by RFC 3647, section headings that do not apply are accompanied with the statement "Not applicable" or "No stipulation" along with a brief explanation of the reason.

#### 1.2 DOCUMENT NAME AND IDENTIFICATION

This document is the CP/CPS followed by TunTrust while providing OV SSL certification services and was approved for publication by the TunTrust Board of Directors. This CP/CPS document is disclosed to the public at <a href="https://www.tuntrust.tn/repository">https://www.tuntrust.tn/repository</a>.

Note: The OID of TunTrust is joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) tn(788) public-sector(1) public-sector-enterprises(2) tuntrust(7). The OID of the present document is: 2.16.788.1.2.7.1.1

Revisions of this document have been made as follows:



Code :PL/SMI/16 Version : 02 Date : 30/04/2019

Page : 6 / 71 CL: PU

Version	Date	Comment	Changes
00	19 November 2018	Draft	The whole document
01	12 April 2019	The first CP/CPS document for public	The whole document
02	30 April 2019	The second version of the CP/CPS	Appendix A, B and C

## 1.3 PKI PARTICIPANTS

PKI Participants defined within the scope of this document are the parties bearing relevant rights and obligations within OV SSL certification services of TunTrust.

These parties are defined as CA, registration authority, subscribers and relying parties.


## 1.3.1 CERTIFICATION AUTHORITY (CA)

TunTrust CA provides OV SSL Certification services in accordance with this CP/CPS. As a CA, TunTrust performs functions associated with Public Key operations, including receiving Certificate requests, issuing, revoking and renewing OV SSL Certificate, and maintaining, issuing, and publishing CRLs and OCSP responses.

The TunTrust PKI consists of a two-level CA hierarchy:

- TunTrust Root CA: root-signing all TunTrust issuing CAs and kept offline.
- TunTrust Services CA: This issuing CA is restricted to only issue OV SSL certificates to domain names under ".tn" top-level domain and owned by entities operating under the Tunisian Jurisdiction.
- TunTrust Qualified CA: This issuing CA is technically constrained to prevent issuance of SSL certificates.

Certificate profiles of TunTrust PKI is detailed in Appendix A.





Code :PL/SMI/16 Version : 02 Date : 30/04/2019

Page : 7 / 71 CL: PU

#### 1.3.2 REGISTRATION AUTHORITIES

TunTrust does not delegate the execution of Section 3.2 requirement to a Delegated Third Party. TunTrust operates a registration authority, referred to in this document as TunTrust RA, where all registration procedures are directly executed by TunTrust personnel as described in Section 3.2.

TunTrust personnel involved in the issuance of OV SSL certificates must meet and follow the requirements set out in Sections 4.2 and 5.3.

TunTrust RA manages and performs the following roles and responsibilities:

- Identifying and authenticating Applicants for Certificates,
- Accepting, evaluating, approving or rejecting the registration of Certificate applications,
- Using authorized documents or sources of information to evaluate and authenticate an Applicant's application,
- Initiating the process to revoke a Certificate from the TunTrust CA,
- Archiving of the registration files (electronic and / or paper).

#### 1.3.3 SUBSCRIBERS

Entities under the Tunisian Jurisdiction whose OV SSL certificates are issued by TunTrust and which are responsible for using their certificates in compliance with this CP/CPS.

#### 1.3.4 RELYING PARTIES

Any natural person or legal Entity that relies on a Valid OV SSL Certificate issued by TunTrust CA. Relying parties are responsible for verifying the validity of the Certificates.

To verify the validity of a Certificate, relying parties can refer to the CRL or OCSP response. The locations of the CRL distribution point and OCSP responder are detailed within the Certificate.

## 1.3.5 OTHER PARTICIPANTS

In the addition to the PKI participants described in Sections 1.3.2, 1.3.3 and 1.3.4, TunTrust will involve other parties as needed. TunTrust will contractually obligate each party to comply with all applicable requirements in this CP/CPS and monitor its compliance.

#### 1.4 Certificate Usage

### 1.4.1 APPROPRIATE CERTIFICATE USAGE

OV SSL certificates are used to secure online communication and transactions where the risks of data compromise and fraud exist. The digital certificate allows the end entity to prove its identity to other participants and maintaining the integrity of the transaction.

At all times, Subscribers are required to use Certificates in accordance with this CP/CPS and all applicable laws and regulations.



Code :PL/SMI/16 Version : 02 Date : 30/04/2019

Page : 8 / 71 CL: PU

#### 1.4.2 PROHIBITED CERTIFICATE USES

Certificate use is restricted by using Certificate extensions on key usage and extended key usage. Any usage of the Certificate inconsistent with these extensions is not authorized. Certificates shall be used only to the extent the use is consistent with applicable law.

OV SSL Certificates issued under this CP/CPS do not guarantee that the Subject is trustworthy, operating a reputable business or that the equipment on which the Certificate has been installed is not free from defect, malware or virus.

#### 1.5 POLICY ADMINISTRATION

#### 1.5.1 ORGANIZATION ADMINISTERING THE DOCUMENT

The organization administering the CP/CPS is TunTrust. Its Board of Directors acts as the Policy Authority. The Board of Directors is composed of the senior management of TunTrust.

The TunTrust Board of Directors is the highest level management body with final authority and responsibility for:

- Specifying and approving the TunTrust infrastructure and practices,
- Approving the TunTrust CP/CPS,
- Defining the review process for practices and policies including responsibilities for maintaining the CP/CPS,
- Defining the review process that ensures that the TunTrust CA properly implement the above practices,
- Publication to the Subscribers and Relying Parties of the CP/CPS and its revisions.

Requests for information as well as any other inquiry associated with this CP/CPS should be addressed to:

TUNTRUST - Agence Nationale de Certification Electronique Policy Authority Technopark El Ghazala, Road of Raoued, Ariana, 2083 Tunisia.

Tel.: +216 70 834 600 Mail: pki@tuntrust.tn

Web: <a href="https://www.tuntrust.tn">https://www.tuntrust.tn</a>

### 1.5.2 CONTACT PERSON

The contact person, designated by the Board of Directors of TunTrust, is a member of the Board of Directors of TunTrust. See section 1.5.1 for contact details.

#### 1.5.3 Person determining CP/CPS suitability for the policy



Code :PL/SMI/16 Version : 02 Date : 30/04/2019

Page : 9 / 71 CL: PU

The Policy Authority is responsible for determining the suitability and applicability of this CP/CPS based on the results and recommendations received from a Qualified Auditor as specified in Section 8.

#### 1.5.4 CP/CPS APPROVAL PROCEDURE

TunTrust's Policy Authority will approve the CP/CPS, along with any amendments. Any amendments made to the CP/CPS will be reviewed by the Policy Authority for consistency with the practices that are implemented prior to its approval. Changes made will be tracked within the revision table. Refer to Section 9.12 below for CP/CPS amendment procedure.

### 1.6 DEFINITIONS AND ACRONYMS

#### 1.6.1 **DEFINITIONS**

**Affiliate:** A corporation, partnership, joint venture or other entity controlling, controlled by, or under common control with another entity, or an agency, department, political subdivision, or any entity operating under the direct control of a Government Entity.

**Applicant:** The natural person or Legal Entity that applies for (or seeks renewal of) a Certificate. Once the Certificate issues, the Applicant is referred to as the Subscriber. For Certificates issued to devices, the Applicant is the entity that controls or operates the device named in the Certificate, even if the device is sending the actual Certificate request.

Applicant Representative: A natural person or human sponsor who is either the Applicant, employed by the Applicant, or an authorized agent who has express authority to represent the Applicant: (i) who signs and submits, or approves a Certificate request on behalf of the Applicant, and/or (ii) who signs and submits a Subscriber Agreement on behalf of the Applicant, and/or (iii) who acknowledges the Terms of Use on behalf of the Applicant when the Applicant is an Affiliate of the CA or is the CA.

**Application Software Supplier:** A supplier of Internet browser software or other relying-party application software that displays or uses Certificates and incorporates Root Certificates.

**Attestation Letter:** A letter attesting that Subject Information is correct written by an accountant, lawyer, government official or other reliable third party customarily relied upon for such information.

**Audit Period:** In a period-of-time audit, the period between the first day (start) and the last day of operations (end) covered by the auditors in their engagement. (This is not the same as the period of time when the auditors are on-site at the CA.) The coverage rules and maximum length of audit periods are defined in section 8.1.

**Audit Report:** A report from a Qualified Auditor stating the Qualified Auditor's opinion on whether an entity's processes and controls comply with the mandatory provisions of these Requirements.

**Authorization Domain Name:** The Domain Name used to obtain authorization for Certificate issuance for a given FQDN. The CA may use the FQDN returned from a DNS CNAME lookup as the FQDN for the purposes of domain validation. If the FQDN contains a wildcard character, then the CA MUST remove all wildcard labels from the left most portion of requested FQDN. The CA may prune zero or more labels from left to right until encountering a Base Domain Name and may use any one of the intermediate values for the purpose of domain validation.

Authorized Ports: One of the following ports: 80 (http), 443 (http), 25 (smtp), 22 (ssh).



Code :PL/SMI/16 Version : 02 Date : 30/04/2019

Page : 10 / 71 CL: PU

**Base Domain Name**: The portion of an applied-for FQDN that is the first domain name node left of a registry controlled or public suffix plus the registry-controlled or public suffix (e.g. "example.co.uk" or "example.com"). For FQDNs where the right-most domain name node is a gTLD having ICANN Specification 13 in its registry agreement, the gTLD itself may be used as the Base Domain Name.

**Baseline Requirements:** The Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates as published by the CA/Browser Forum and any amendments to such document.

**CAA:** From RFC 6844 (http:tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6844): "The Certification Authority Authorization (CAA) DNS Resource Record allows a DNS domain name holder to specify the Certification Authorities (CAs) authorized to issue Certificates for that domain. Publication of CAA Resource Records allows a public Certification Authority to implement additional controls to reduce the risk of unintended Certificate misissue."

**Certificate:** An electronic document that uses a digital signature to bind a public key and an identity.

**Certificate Data:** Certificate requests and data related thereto (whether obtained from the Applicant or otherwise) in the CA's possession or control or to which the CA has access.

**Certificate Management Process**: Processes, practices, and procedures associated with the use of keys, software, and hardware, by which the CA verifies Certificate Data, issues Certificates, maintains a Repository, and revokes Certificates.

**Certificate Policy:** A set of rules that indicates the applicability of a named Certificate to a particular community and/or PKI implementation with common security requirements.

**Certificate Problem Report**: Complaint of suspected Key Compromise, Certificate misuse, or other types of fraud, compromise, misuse, or inappropriate conduct related to Certificates.

**Certificate Transparency:** To ensure Certificates function properly throughout their lifecycle, TunTrust will log SSL Certificates with a public Certificate transparency database if the subscriber signs the subscriber agreement and therefore opts for the publication of the log containing information relating to his certificate. Because this will become a requirement for Certificate functionality, Subscriber cannot opt out of this process. Log server information is publicly accessible. Once submitted, information cannot be removed from a log server.

**Certificate Revocation List**: A regularly updated time-stamped list of revoked Certificates that is created and digitally signed by the CA that issued the Certificates.

**Certification Authority:** An organization that is responsible for the creation, issuance, revocation, and management of Certificates. The term applies equally to both Roots CAs and Subordinate CAs.

**Certification Practice Statement:** One of several documents forming the governance framework in which Certificates are created, issued, managed, and used.

**Contract Signer**: A natural person who is either the Applicant, employed by the Applicant, or an authorized agent who has express authority to represent the Applicant, and who has authority on behalf of the Applicant to sign Subscriber Agreements

**Control:** "Control" (and its correlative meanings, "controlled by" and "under common control with") means possession, directly or indirectly, of the power to: (1) direct the management, personnel, finances, or plans of such entity; (2) control the election of a majority of the directors; or (3) vote that portion of voting shares required for "control" under the law of the entity's Jurisdiction of Incorporation or Registration but in no case less than 10%.



Code :PL/SMI/16 Version : 02 Date : 30/04/2019

Page : 11 / 71 CL: PU

**Country**: Either a member of the United Nations OR a geographic region recognized as a Sovereign State by at least two UN member nations.

Cross Certificate: A Certificate that is used to establish a trust relationship between two Root CAs.

**CSPRNG:** A random number generator intended for use in cryptographic system.

**Delegated Third Party**: A natural person or Legal Entity that is not the CA, and whose activities are not within the scope of the appropriate CA audits, but is authorized by the CA to assist in the Certificate Management Process by performing or fulfilling one or more of the CA requirements found herein.

**DNS CAA Email Contact:** The email address defined in section B.1.1 of the Baseline Requirements.

**DNS TXT Record Email Contact:** The email address defined in section B.2.1 of the Baseline Requirements.

**DNS TXT Record Phone Contact**: The phone number defined in section B.2.2 of the Baseline Requirements.

**Domain Authorization Document:** Documentation provided by, or a CA's documentation of a communication with, a Domain Name Registrar, the Domain Name Registrant, or the person or entity listed in WHOIS as the Domain Name Registrant (including any private, anonymous, or proxy registration service) attesting to the authority of an Applicant to request a Certificate for a specific Domain Namespace.

**Domain Contact:** The Domain Name Registrant, technical contact, or administrative contract (or the equivalent under a ccTLD) as listed in the WHOIS record of the Base Domain Name or in a DNS SOA record, or as obtained through direct contact with the Domain Name Registrar.

**Domain Name:** The label assigned to a node in the Domain Name System. Domain Namespace: The set of all possible Domain Names those are subordinate to a single node in the Domain Name System.

**Domain Name Registrant:** Sometimes referred to as the "owner" of a Domain Name, but more properly the person(s) or entity(ies) registered with a Domain Name Registrar as having the right to control how a Domain Name is used, such as the natural person or Legal Entity that is listed as the "Registrant" by WHOIS or the Domain Name Registrar.

**Domain Name Registrar:** A person or entity that registers Domain Names under the auspices of or by agreement with: (i) the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), (ii) a national Domain Name authority/registry, or (iii) a Network Information Center (including their affiliates, contractors, delegates, successors, or assigns). Effective Date: 1 July 2012.

Expiry Date: The "Not After" date in a Certificate that defines the end of a Certificate's validity period.

**Fully-Qualified Domain Name:** A Domain Name that includes the labels of all superior nodes in the Internet Domain Name System.

**Government Agency**: In the context of a Private Organization, the government agency in the Jurisdiction of Incorporation under whose authority the legal existence of Private Organizations is established (e.g., the government agency that issued the Certificate of Incorporation). In the context of Business Entities, the government agency in the jurisdiction of operation that registers business entities. In the case of a Government Entity, the entity that enacts law, regulations, or decrees establishing the legal existence of Government Entities.

**Government Entity:** A government-operated legal entity, agency, department, ministry, branch, or similar element of the government of a country, or political subdivision within such country (such as a state, province, city, county, etc.).



Code :PL/SMI/16 Version : 02 Date : 30/04/2019 Page : 12 / 71

CL: PU

**High Risk Certificate Request**: A Request that the CA flags for additional scrutiny by reference to internal criteria and databases maintained by the CA, which may include names at higher risk for phishing or other fraudulent usage, names contained in previously rejected Certificate requests or revoked Certificates, names listed on the Miller Smiles phishing list or the Google Safe Browsing list, or names that the CA identifies using its own risk-mitigation criteria.

Individual: A natural person.

**Internal Name:** A string of characters (not an IP address) in a Common Name or Subject Alternative Name field of a Certificate that cannot be verified as globally unique within the public DNS at the time of Certificate issuance because it does not end with a Top Level Domain registered in IANA's Root Zone Database.

**IP Address:** A 32-bit or 128-bit label assigned to a device that uses the Internet Protocol for communication.

**IP Address Contact:** The person(s) or entity(ies) registered with an IP Address Registration Authority as having the right to control how one or more IP Addresses are used.

**IP Address Registration Authority:** The Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) or a Regional Internet Registry (RIPE, APNIC, ARIN, AfriNIC, LACNIC).

**Issuing CA:** In relation to a particular Certificate, the CA that issued the Certificate. This could be either a Root CA or a Subordinate CA.

**Key Compromise**: A Private Key is said to be compromised if its value has been disclosed to an unauthorized person or an unauthorized person has had access to it

**Key Generation Script:** A documented plan of procedures for the generation of a CA Key Pair.

**Key Pair:** The Private Key and its associated Public Key.

**Legal Entity**: An association, corporation, partnership, proprietorship, trust, government entity or other entity with legal standing in a country's legal system.

**Multi-Factor Authentication:** An authentication mechanism consisting of two or more of the following independent categories of credentials (i.e. factors) to verify the user's identity for a login or other transaction: something you know (knowledge factor), something you have (possession factor), and something you are (inherence factor). Each factor must be independent. Certificate based authentication can be used as part of Multifactor Authentication only if the private key is stored in a Secure Key Storage Device.

**Object Identifier:** A unique alphanumeric or numeric identifier registered under the International Organization for Standardization's applicable standard for a specific object or object class.

**OCSP Responder:** An online server operated under the authority of the CA and connected to its Repository for processing Certificate status requests. See also, Online Certificate Status Protocol.

**Online Certificate Status Protocol:** An online Certificate-checking protocol that enables relying-party application software to determine the status of an identified Certificate. See also OCSP Responder.

**Parent Company:** A company that Controls a Subsidiary Company.

**Private Key:** The key of a Key Pair that is kept secret by the holder of the Key Pair, and that is used to create Digital Signatures and/or to decrypt electronic records or files that were encrypted with the corresponding Public Key.



Code :PL/SMI/16 Version : 02 Date : 30/04/2019 Page : 13 / 71

CL: PU

**Public Key:** The key of a Key Pair that may be publicly disclosed by the holder of the corresponding Private Key and that is used by a Relying Party to verify Digital Signatures created with the holder's corresponding Private Key and/or to encrypt messages so that they can be decrypted only with the holder's corresponding Private Key.

**Public Key Infrastructure:** A set of hardware, software, people, procedures, rules, policies, and obligations used to facilitate the trustworthy creation, issuance, management, and use of Certificates and keys based on Public Key Cryptography.

**Publicly-Trusted Certificate:** A Certificate that is trusted by virtue of the fact that its corresponding Root Certificate is distributed as a trust anchor in widely-available application software.

**Qualified Auditor**: A natural person or Legal Entity that meets the requirements of Section 8.2 of the CA/B Forum Baseline Requirements.

Random Value: A value specified by a CA to the Applicant that exhibits at least 112 bits of entropy

Registered Domain Name: A Domain Name that has been registered with a Domain Name Registrar.

**Registration Authority (RA):** Any Legal Entity that is responsible for identification and authentication of subjects of Certificates, but is not a CA, and hence does not sign or issue Certificates. An RA may assist in the Certificate application process or revocation process or both. When "RA" is used as an adjective to describe a role or function, it does not necessarily imply a separate body, but can be part of the CA.

**Reliable Data Source:** An identification document or source of data used to verify Subject Identity Information that is generally recognized among commercial enterprises and governments as reliable, and which was created by a third party for a purpose other than the Applicant obtaining a Certificate.

**Reliable Method of Communication:** A method of communication, such as a postal/courier delivery address, telephone number, or email address, that was verified using a source other than the Applicant Representative.

**Relying Party:** Any natural person or Legal Entity that relies on a Valid Certificate. An Application Software Supplier is not considered a Relying Party when software distributed by such Supplier merely displays information relating to a Certificate. Relying Parties must read and agree to TunTrust's relying party agreement available at <a href="https://www.tuntrust.tn/repository">https://www.tuntrust.tn/repository</a>.

**Repository:** An online database containing publicly-disclosed PKI governance documents (such as Certificate Policies and Certification Practice Statements) and Certificate status information, either in the form of a CRL or an OCSP response.

Request Token: A value derived in a method specified by the CA which binds this demonstration of control to the certificate request. The Request Token SHALL incorporate the key used in the certificate request. A Request Token MAY include a timestamp to indicate when it was created. A Request Token MAY include other information to ensure its uniqueness. A Request Token that includes a timestamp SHALL remain valid for no more than 30 days from the time of creation. A Request Token that includes a timestamp SHALL be treated as invalid if its timestamp is in the future. A Request Token that does not include a timestamp is valid for a single use and the CA SHALL NOT re-use it for a subsequent validation. The binding SHALL use a digital signature algorithm or a cryptographic hash algorithm at least as strong as that to be used in signing the certificate request.

**Required Website Content:** Either a Random Value or a Request Token, together with additional information that uniquely identifies the Subscriber, as specified by the CA.



Code :PL/SMI/16 Version : 02 Date : 30/04/2019 Page : 14 / 71

CL: PU

Requirements: The Baseline Requirements of the CA/B Forum.

Reserved IP Address: An IPv4 or IPv6 address that the IANA has marked as reserved:

http://www.iana.org/assignments/ipv4-address-space/ipv4-address-space.xml

http://www.iana.org/assignments/ipv6-address-space/ipv6-address-space.xml

**Root CA:** The top level Certification Authority whose Root Certificate is distributed by Application Software Suppliers and that issues Subordinate CA Certificates.

**Root Certificate:** The self-signed Certificate issued by the Root CA to identify itself and to facilitate verification of Certificates issued to its Subordinate CAs.

**Root Key Generation Script**: A documented plan of procedures to be performed for the generation of the Root CA Key Pair.

**Secure Key Storage Device:** A device certified as meeting at least FIPS 140-2 level 2 overall, level 3 physical, or Common Criteria (EAL 4+)

**Sovereign State:** A state or country that administers its own government, and is not dependent upon, or subject to, another power.

**Subject:** The natural person, device, system, unit, or Legal Entity identified in a Certificate as the Subject. The Subject is either the Subscriber or a device under the control and operation of the Subscriber.

**Subject Identity Information:** Information that identifies the Certificate Subject. Subject Identity Information does not include a domain name listed in the subjectAltName extension or the Subject commonName field.

**Subordinate CA:** A Certification Authority whose Certificate is signed by the Root CA, or another Subordinate CA.

**Subscriber:** A natural person or Legal Entity to whom a Certificate is issued and who is legally bound by a Subscriber Agreement.

**Subscriber Agreement:** An agreement between the CA and the Applicant/Subscriber that specifies the rights and responsibilities of the parties available at <a href="https://www.tuntrust.tn/repository">https://www.tuntrust.tn/repository</a>.

**Subsidiary Company:** A company that is controlled by a Parent Company.

**Technically Constrained Subordinate CA Certificate:** A Subordinate CA Certificate which uses a combination of Extended Key Usage settings and Name Constraint settings to limit the scope within which the Subordinate CA Certificate may issue Subscriber or additional Subordinate CA Certificates.

**Terms of Use:** Provisions regarding the safekeeping and acceptable uses of a Certificate issued in accordance with these Requirements when the Applicant/Subscriber is an Affiliate of the CA or is the CA.

**Test Certificate:** A Certificate with a maximum validity period of 30 days and which: (i) includes a critical extension with the specified Test Certificate CABF OID (2.23.140.2.1), or (ii) is issued under a CA where there are no Certificate paths/chains to a root Certificate subject to these Requirements.

**Trustworthy System:** Computer hardware, software, and procedures that are: reasonably secure from intrusion and misuse; provide a reasonable level of availability, reliability, and correct operation; are reasonably suited to performing their intended functions; and enforce the applicable security policy.

**Unregistered Domain Name:** A Domain Name that is not a Registered Domain Name.



Code :PL/SMI/16 Version : 02 Date : 30/04/2019

Page : 15 / 71 CL: PU

Valid Certificate: A Certificate that passes the validation procedure specified in RFC 5280.

**Validation Specialists:** Someone who performs the information verification duties specified by these Requirements.

**Validity Period:** The period of time measured from the date when the Certificate is issued until the Expiry Date

**WHOIS:** Information retrieved directly from the Domain Name Registrar or registry operator via the protocol defined in RFC 3912, the Registry Data Access Protocol defined in RFC 7482, or an HTTPS website.

**Wildcard Certificate:** A Certificate containing an asterisk (\*) in the left-most position of any of the Subject Fully-Qualified Domain Names contained in the Certificate.

**Wildcard Domain Name:** A Domain Name consisting of a single asterisk character followed by a single full stop character ("\*.") followed by a Fully-Qualified Domain Name.

### 1.6.2 ACRONYMS

AICPA American Institute of Certified Public Accountants

CA Certification Authority

CAA Certification Authority Authorization ccTLD Country Code Top-Level Domain

CP Certificate Policy

CPS Certification Practice Statement
CRL Certificate Revocation List

CRL Certificate Revocation List
CSP Certification Service Provider

DBA Doing Business As

DNS Domain Name System FIPS (US Government) Federal Information Processing Standard

FQDN Fully Qualified Domain Name

IANA Internet Assigned Numbers Authority

ICANN Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers

ISO International Organization for Standardization

NIST (US Government) National Institute of Standards and Technology

OCSP Online Certificate Status Protocol

OID Object Identifier

PKI Public Key Infrastructure
RA Registration Authority
SSL Secure Sockets Layer
TLD Top-Level Domain

TLS Transport Layer Security VOIP Voice Over Internet Protocol

TN Tunisia

## 2 Publication and Repository Responsibilities

#### 2.1 REPOSITORIES

TunTrust makes the following available on its public repository at <a href="https://www.tuntrust.tn/repository">https://www.tuntrust.tn/repository</a>:



Code :PL/SMI/16 Version : 02 Date : 30/04/2019

Page: 16 / 71 CL: PU

- TunTrust CP/CPS;
- Subscriber contractual agreements (e.g. Subscriber Agreement, Application Forms, etc.);
- Audit Reports by Qualified Auditors;
- Certification Authority Certificates and related Authority Revocation Lists (ARLs);
- Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs).

For further details regarding the publication of information refer to section 2.2.

TunTrust ensures that revocation data for issued Certificates and its Root Certificates are available in accordance with the CP/CPS.

#### 2.2 Publication of Certification Information

TunTrust conforms to the current version of the Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates published at <a href="http://www.cabforum.org">http://www.cabforum.org</a>. In the event of any inconsistency between this document and those Requirements, those Requirements take precedence over this document.

TunTrust publishes information mentioned in section 2.1 on its publicly accessible website https://www.tuntrust.tn/repository that is available on a 24x7 basis.

In addition, TunTrust publishes test Web pages that allow Application Software Suppliers to test their software with Subscriber Certificates that chain up to each publicly trusted Root Certificate. These test Web pages are accessible at the following URLs:

valid Certificate: https://validovssl.tuntrust.tn/

revoked Certificate: <a href="https://revokedovssl.tuntrust.tn/">https://revokedovssl.tuntrust.tn/</a>

expired Certificate: <a href="https://expiredovssl.tuntrust.tn/">https://expiredovssl.tuntrust.tn/</a>

## 2.3 Time or Frequency of Publication

TunTrust reviews its CP/CPS at least annually and makes appropriate changes so that TunTrust CA operation remains accurate, transparent and complies with requirements listed in Section 8 of this document. TunTrust CA closely monitors CA/Browser Forum ballots and updates to the Baseline Requirements and implements updates to TunTrust operations in a timely manner. New or modified versions of this CP/CPS, Subscriber Agreements, or Relying Party agreements are published within seven days after approval.

Publication frequency of CRLs and frequency of updating OCSP records are specified in Sections 4.9.7 and 4.9.9.

## **2.4** Access controls on repositories

Read-only access to Repositories is available to Relying Parties.

#### 3 IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

### 3.1 Naming

## 3.1.1 Types of names



Code :PL/SMI/16 Version : 02 Date : 30/04/2019 Page : 17 / 71

CL: PU

The Subscriber is described in the Certificate by a distinguished name pursuant to the X.501 standard.

#### 3.1.2 NEED FOR NAMES TO BE MEANINGFUL

TunTrust uses Distinguished Name (DN) that identifies the subject of the Certificate. The subject name contained in a Certificate must be meaningful in the sense that TunTrust has proper evidence of the existing association between this name and the entity to which it belongs. To achieve this goal, the use of a name must be authorized by the rightful owner or a legal representative of the rightful owner.

#### 3.1.3 Anonymity or pseudonymity of Subscribers

TunTrust does not issue anonymous or pseudonymous Certificates.

#### 3.1.4 RULES FOR INTERPRETING VARIOUS NAME FORMS

Many languages have special characters that are not supported by the ASCII character set used to define the subject in Certificates. To avoid problems, local substitution rules are used in general, national characters are represented by their ASCII equivalent, (e.g. é, è, à, ç are represented by e, e, a, c).

#### 3.1.5 UNIQUENESS OF NAMES

The full combination of the Subject Attributes (DN) has to be unique and shall conform to all applicable X.500 standards for the uniqueness of names. The SerialNumber attribute guarantees the uniqueness of the DN in the Certificate.

## 3.1.6 RECOGNITION, AUTHENTICATION, AND ROLE OF TRADEMARKS

TunTrust will issue certificates including trademarks only if the trademark is registered in the Tunisian National business rRegister which is called "Registre National des Entreprises". TunTrust will not issue certificates with trademarks that are not documented in the National Register of Enterprises.

## 3.2 INITIAL IDENTITY VALIDATION

TunTrust may perform identification of the Applicant using any legal means of communication or investigation necessary to identify the Legal Entity or individual.

## 3.2.1 METHOD TO PROVE POSSESSION OF PRIVATE KEY

The Applicant provides a digitally signed PKCS#10 CSR to establish that it holds the private key corresponding to the public key to be included in a Certificate. TunTrust parses the PKCS#10 CSR submitted by the Applicant and verifies that the Applicant's digital signature on the PKCS#10 was created by the private key corresponding to the public key in the PKCS#10 CSR.

## 3.2.2 AUTHENTICATION OF ORGANIZATION IDENTITY

TunTrust issues OV SSL Certificates for public and private organizations under the Tunisian Jurisdiction and having a domain name under the ".tn" top-level domain.



Code :PL/SMI/16 Version : 02 Date : 30/04/2019

Page : 18 / 71 CL: PU

TunTrust verifies the identity of the Applicant, and the authenticity of the Applicant Representative's certificate request using a verification process meeting the requirements of Section 3.2.2.1. TunTrust inspects any document relied upon for alteration or falsification.

#### 3.2.2.1 IDENTITY

TunTrust uses two methods to verify the existence and identity of the organization:

- For Ministries and administrative public enterprises: TunTrust will obtain an excerpt from Official
  Gazette of Tunisia that proves the legal existence of the entity. Other information such as the
  address of the entity and the identity of the assigned responsible of the entity are verified based on
  other legal documents and official correspondences with the requesting agency or a superior
  government entity.
- For non-administrative public enterprises and private entities: TunTrust will obtain a recent extract
  from the Tunisian National Register of Enterprises that is not older than 03 months. The register
  extract includes at a minimum the legal name, legal address, tax identification number, first name
  and last name of the legal representative.

In order to validate the relationship of a physical person requesting an OV SSL certificate with the organization, the following official documents are required:

- a) A copy of the identity evidence (identity card, passport or Tunisia residency card) of one of the physical persons who is a legal representative of the organization is required.
- b) A copy of the identity evidence (identity card, passport or Tunisia residency card) of the Server Administrator (Contract Signer).

#### 3.2.2.2 DBA/TRADENAME

If the Subject Identity Information is to include a DBA or tradename, TunTrust verifies the Applicant's right to use the DBA/tradename using at least one of the following:

- a) A recent extract from the Tunisian National Register of Enterprises not older than 3 months;
- b) Communication with a government entity responsible for the management of such DBAs or tradenames.

## 3.2.2.3 VERIFICATION OF COUNTRY

TunTrust verifies that the organization is in Tunisian jurisdiction. The country field is always set to Tunisia ISO format country code "TN". TunTrust does not issue SSL certificates to organizations that are not under the Tunisian Jurisdiction.

### 3.2.2.4 VALIDATION OF DOMAIN AUTHORIZATION OR CONTROL

TunTrust confirms that prior to issuance, TunTrust has validated each Fully-Qualified Domain Name (FQDN) listed in the Certificate using at least one of the methods listed below.

TunTrust maintains a record of which domain validation method, including relevant BR version number, that was used to validate every domain.

## 3.2.2.4.1 VALIDATING THE APPLICANT AS A DOMAIN CONTACT

TunTrust does not use this method.



Code :PL/SMI/16 Version : 02 Date : 30/04/2019

Page: 19 / 71

CL: PU

#### 3.2.2.4.2 EMAIL TO DOMAIN CONTACT

TunTrust confirms the Applicant's control over the FQDN or Wildcard Domain Names by sending a Random Value via email to one recipient or more identified as a Domain Contact (domain name registrant contact, administrative contact or technical contact) listed in WHOIS records, and then receiving a confirming response utilizing the Random Value. Each email may confirm control of multiple Authorization Domain Names.

The Random Value is unique in each email. TunTrust may resend the email in its entirety, including re-use of the Random Value, provided that the communication's entire contents and recipient(s) remain unchanged. The Random Value remains valid for use in a confirming response for no more than 30 days from its creation.

If the FQDN has been validated using this method, TunTrust may also issue Certificates for other FQDNs that end with all the labels of the validated FQDN.

#### 3.2.2.4.3 PHONE CONTACT WITH DOMAIN CONTACT

TunTrust does not use this method.

#### 3.2.2.4.4 CONSTRUCTED EMAIL TO DOMAIN CONTACT

TunTrust confirms the Applicant's control over the FQDN or Wildcard Domain names by sending an email including a unique Random Value to Domain Contact created by using 'admin'|'administrator'|'webmaster'|'hostmaster'|'postmaster'@'Authorization Domain name', and receiving a response using the Random Value.

Each email may confirm control of multiple FQDNs, provided the Authorization Domain Name used in the email is an Authorization Domain Name for each FQDN being confirmed.

The email with no content and no recipient modification may be re-sent in its entirety, including the re-use of the Random Value.

The Random Value remains valid for use in a confirming response for no more than 30 days from its creation.

Once the FQDN has been validated using this method, TunTrust may also issue Certificates for other FQDNs that end with all the labels of the validated FQDN.

#### 3.2.2.4.5 DOMAIN AUTHORIZATION DOCUMENT

TunTrust does not use this method.

#### 3.2.2.4.6 AGREED-UPON CHANGE TO WEBSITE

TunTrust does not use this method.

#### 3.2.2.4.7 DNS CHANGE

TunTrust does not use this method.

#### 3.2.2.4.8 IP ADDRESS

TunTrust does not use this method.

#### 3.2.2.4.9 TEST CERTIFICATE

TunTrust does not use this method.



Code :PL/SMI/16 Version : 02 Date : 30/04/2019 Page : 20 / 71

CL: PU

#### 3.2.2.4.10 TLS USING A RANDOM NUMBER

TunTrust does not use this method.

## 3.2.2.4.11 ANY OTHER METHOD

TunTrust does not use any other method.

#### 3.2.2.4.12 VALIDATING APPLICANT AS A DOMAIN CONTACT

TunTrust does not use this method.

#### 3.2.2.4.13 EMAIL TO DNS CAA CONTACT

TunTrust may confirm the Applicant's control over the FQDN by sending a Random Value via email to a DNS CAA Email Contact and then receiving a confirming response utilizing the Random Value. In this case, the relevant CAA Resource Record Set is found using the search algorithm defined in RFC 6844 Section 4, as amended by Errata 5065 (Appendix A of the BR).

Each email may confirm control of multiple FQDNs, provided that each email address is a DNS CAA Email Contact for each Authorization Domain Name being validated. The same email may be sent to multiple recipients as long as all recipients are DNS CAA Email Contacts for each Authorization Domain Name being validated.

The Random Value is unique in each email. TunTrust may re-send the email in its entirety, including the reuse of the Random Value, provided that its entire contents and recipient(s) remain unchanged. The Random Value remains valid for use in a confirming response for no more than 30 days from its creation.

#### 3.2.2.4.14 EMAIL TO DNS TXT CONTACT

TunTrust may confirm the Applicant's control over the FQDN by sending a Random Value via email and then receiving a confirming response utilizing the Random Value. In this case, the Random Value is sent to a DNS TXT Record Email Contact for the Authorization Domain Name selected to validate the FQDN.

Each email may confirm control of multiple FQDNs, provided that each email address is DNS TXT Record Email Contact for each Authorization Domain Name being validated. The same email may be sent to multiple recipients as long as all recipients are DNS TXT Record Email Contacts for each Authorization Domain Name being validated.

The Random Value is unique in each email. TunTrust may re-send the email in its entirety, including the reuse of the Random Value, provided that its entire contents and recipient(s) remain unchanged. The Random Value remains valid for use in a confirming response for no more than 30 days from its creation.

#### 3.2.2.4.15 PHONE CONTACT WITH DOMAIN CONTACT

TunTrust does not use this method.

#### 3.2.2.4.16 PHONE CONTACT WITH DNS TXT RECORD PHONE CONTACT

TunTrust does not use this method.

#### 3.2.2.5 AUTHENTICATION FOR AN IP ADDRESS

TunTrust does not issue certificates with IP addresses.



Code :PL/SMI/16 Version : 02 Date : 30/04/2019

Page : 21 / 71 CL: PU

#### 3.2.2.6 WILDCARD DOMAIN VALIDATION

If the FQDN contains a wildcard character, then TunTrust issuing CAs remove all wildcard labels from the left most portion of requested FQDN. TunTrust issuing CAs may prune zero or more labels from left to right until encountering a Base Domain Name and may use any one of the intermediate values for the purpose of domain validation.

Before issuing a Certificate with a wildcard character in a CN or subjectAltName of a type DNS-ID, TunTrust issuing CAs follow an internal documented procedure that determines if the wildcard character occurs in the first label position to the left of a "registry-controlled" label or "public suffix" (e.g. "\*.com", "\*.co.uk", see RFC 6454 Section 8.2 for further explanation).

If a wildcard would fall within the label immediately to the left of a registry-controlled or public suffix, the TunTrust issuing CAs refuse issuance unless the Applicant proves its rightful control of the entire Domain Namespace.

#### 3.2.2.7 DATA SOURCE ACCURACY

TunTrust uses only Tunisian governmental entities as data sources.

Before relying on any data provided, TunTrust will verify the following attributes:

- a) The age of the information provided,
- b) The frequency of updates to the information source,
- c) The data provider and purpose of the data collection,
- d) The public accessibility of the data availability, and
- e) The relative difficulty in falsifying or altering the data.

#### 3.2.2.8 CAA RECORDS

Prior to issuing SSL Certificates, TunTrust checks for CAA records for each dNSName in the subjectAltName extension of the Certificate to be issued as specified in RFC 6844. TunTrust's CAA issuer domain is "tuntrust.tn.". The following cases do not allow TunTrust to authorize the issuance of the certificate:

- The CAA DNS field is present, it contains an "issue" or "issuewild" tag and does not list tuntrust.tn as an authorized Certificate Authority;
- The CAA DNS field is present, it is designated as "critical" and the tag used is not supported by the CA (it is not an "issue" or "issuewild" tag);
- The zone is validly DNSSEC-signed and our DNS query times out.

If any of these cases are encountered, the certificate request is automatically blocked and the applicant is notified by email of the need to update the associated DNS records. TunTrust:

- Caches CAA records for reuse for up to 8 hours
- Supports the issue and issuewild CAA tags
- Processes but does not act on iodef property tag (i.e., TunTrust does not dispatch reports of such issuance requests to the contact(s) stipulated in the CAA iodef record(s))
- Does not support any additional property tags.

TunTrust may not check CAA records for the following exceptions:



Code :PL/SMI/16 Version : 02 Date : 30/04/2019

Page : 22 / 71 CL: PU

- For Certificates for which a Certificate Transparency pre-Certificate was created and logged in at least two public logs, and for which CAA was checked.
- For Certificates issued by a Technically Constrained Issuing CA Certificate, where the lack of CAA checking is an explicit contractual provision in the contract with the Applicant.
- If the CA or an Affiliate of the CA is the DNS Operator (as defined in RFC 7719) of the domain's DNS.

TunTrust treats a record lookup failure as permission to issue if:

- The failure is outside the TunTrust 's infrastructure;
- The lookup has been retried at least once; and
- The domain's zone does not have a DNSSEC validation chain to the ICANN root

#### 3.2.2.9 VERIFICATION AGAINST THE DENIED LIST

TunTrust CA maintains an internal database of all previously revoked SSL Certificates and previously rejected certificate requests due to suspected phishing or other fraudulent usage or concerns. TunTrust uses this information to identify subsequent suspicious certificate requests. If a new request for a previously denied SSL Certificate is made, the application will be flagged and brought to the attention of management to complete further internal verification and final decision.

#### 3.2.2.10 VERIFICATION AGAINST HIGH RISK CERTIFICATE REQUEST

TunTrust develops, maintains, and implements documented procedures that identify and require additional verification activity for High Risk Certificate Requests prior to the Certificate's approval, as reasonably necessary to ensure that such requests are properly verified by doing the following:

- TunTrust maintains a list of prior high risk requests specifying current high risk Domain Names. This
  list is used by TunTrust to identify potential risks.
- TunTrust also uses an automated Domain name permutation engine for detecting potential typosquatting and phishing threat.

Application with potential High Risk will be flagged and brought to the attention of management to complete further internal verification and final decision.

#### 3.2.3 AUTHENTICATION OF INDIVIDUAL IDENTITY

TunTrust does not issue OV SSL certificates to natural persons. However, as part of the certificate application process, TunTrust will verify the identity of the contract signer and the legal representative of the organization as detailed in Section 3.2.2.1.

## 3.2.4 Non-verified Subscriber information

Unverified information is never included in TunTrust end entities Certificates. All Subscriber information included in Certificates are duly verified.

### 3.2.5 VALIDATION OF AUTHORITY

Verification through a reliable means of communication with the organization Applicant together with verification that the Applicant has ownership or control of the domain name via the methods listed in Section 3.2.2.

#### 3.2.6 CRITERIA FOR INTEROPERATION



Code :PL/SMI/16 Version : 02 Date : 30/04/2019

Page : 23 / 71 CL: PU

Not applicable. TunTrust does not have any cross-certificates with other CAs.

## 3.3 IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION FOR RE-KEY REQUESTS

#### 3.3.1 IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION FOR ROUTINE RE-KEY

Not Applicable. TunTrust does not support rekey.

#### 3.3.2 IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION FOR RE-KEY AFTER REVOCATION

Not Applicable. TunTrust does not support re-key.

## 3.4 IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION FOR REVOCATION REQUEST

Revocation requests are authenticated to ensure they emanate from authorized persons. The process how the revocation request can be submitted is described in Section 4.9.3.

TunTrust may also perform revocation on behalf of Subscribers in accordance with the requirements of the applicable Subscriber Agreement. Examples of reasons for revocation include a breach of the Subscriber Agreement or non-payment of applicable fees.

## 4 Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements

### 4.1 CERTIFICATE APPLICATION

#### 4.1.1 WHO CAN SUBMIT A CERTIFICATE APPLICATION

OV SSL certificates applications can only be submitted by Applicant under the Tunisian Jurisdiction and must include the wet signature and seal of the legal representative in accordance with national laws and regulation.

TunTrust maintains its own blacklists of individuals from whom and entities from which it will not accept Certificate applications. In addition, other external sources such as government denied lists or internationally recognized denied persons lists which are applicable to the jurisdictions in which TunTrust operates are used to screen out unwanted Applicants.

Applicants must comply with provisions set within the registration forms and processes, the CP/CPS and the TunTrust end-user terms and conditions.

## 4.1.2 ENROLLMENT PROCESS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

TunTrust makes available to Applicants all required Application forms as well as all applicable Subscriber Agreements: (i) on its public repository at https://www.tuntrust.tn/repository, (ii) by email to tuntrust@tuntrust.tn (iii) and within its headquarters (see Section 1.5.2).

The Applicant commits to providing a current, genuine and complete certificate request and all evidence requested by TunTrust. The paper Application, with the original signature of the Applicant legal representative and the contract signer, must be physically submitted to a TunTrust RA operator.



Code :PL/SMI/16 Version : 02 Date : 30/04/2019 Page : 24 / 71

CL: PU

The Applicant shall generate the key pair by itself and shall create a Certificate Signing Request (CSR) as to prove that the private key belongs to itself and sends this to TunTrust RA from email address used to verify domain control or provides it to TunTrust RA operator on a hardware device (CD, USB Token). The Applicant shall take all required measures for protecting confidentiality and integrity of its private key.

TunTrust's responsibility is to verify and to validate the information supplied. This will be done in compliance with the practices stated in this CP/CPS and by strictly following the TunTrust registration procedures and the applicable national laws.

TunTrust guarantees that all required verifications have been performed prior to successful registration leading to Certificate issuance and that all certificate requests submitted to the Issuing CAs are complete, accurate, valid and duly authorized. It also guarantees the accuracy of all information contained in the Certificate.

## 4.2 CERTIFICATE APPLICATION PROCESSING

#### 4.2.1 Performing Identification and Authentication Functions

Applications for OV SSL Certificates shall be submitted by the legal representative of the organization who owns the Domain Name.

OV SSL Certificate application includes the following:

- Order Form including the Certificate terms and conditions of use falling into two parts:
  - The "Applicant Part" must be duly completed and signed by the Applicant legal representative.
  - The "Contract Signer Part" must be duly filled in and signed by an Applicant agent who will be responsible for requesting, installing and maintaining the trusted system for which an SSL Certificate has been issued.
  - The same person can be contract signer and legal representative of the Applicant.
- Documents proving the legal existence of the Applicant (Section 3.2.2)
- Copy of the ID of the legal representative (identity card, passport or Tunisia residency card)
- Copy of the ID of the contract signer (identity card, passport or Tunisia residency card)
- The Certificate Signing Request (CSR) that includes at least one Fully-Qualified Domain Name to be included in the Certificate's SubjectAltName extension.

The following verification tasks are performed by TunTrust's RA:

- Validation of the identity and the legal existence of the Applicant (Section 3.2.2): The Applicant must be a legal entity under the Tunisian Jurisdiction;
- Validation of the identity of the legal representative and the contract signer (section 3.2.2);
- Validation of domain control (section 3.2.2.4);
- Assurance that the certificate request does not fall into high risk or black list certificate requests (Section 3.2.2.9 and Section 3.2.2.10);



Code :PL/SMI/16 Version : 02 Date : 30/04/2019 Page : 25 / 71

CL: PU

 Verification of CAA records for each dNSName in the subjectAltName extension of the Certificate to be issued (Section 3.2.2.8).

#### 4.2.2 APPROVAL OR REJECTION OF CERTIFICATE APPLICATIONS

TunTrust will approve or reject Applicant's Certificate request based upon the Applicant meeting the requirements of this CP/CPS and all applicable laws and regulations.

TunTrust rejects any certificate application that TunTrust cannot verify. TunTrust does not issue Certificates for domain names that are not under the ".tn" top-level domain.

TunTrust, in its sole discretion, may reject a Certificate Application, and may refuse to issue a Certificate, without incurring any liability for loss or damages arising out of such refusal. TunTrust reserves the right not to disclose reasons for such a refusal. Applicants whose applications have been rejected may subsequently re-apply.

TunTrust, at its sole discretion not to be unreasonably withheld, may override any decision to Approve Applicant's Certificate request.

#### 4.2.3 TIME TO PROCESS CERTIFICATE APPLICATIONS

Under normal circumstances, TunTrust confirms Certificate application information and issues a Certificate within seven working days as established by Tunisian national law.

## 4.3 CERTIFICATE ISSUANCE

#### 4.3.1 CA ACTIONS DURING CERTIFICATE ISSUANCE

Upon receipt of an approved Certificate signing request, TunTrust Issuing CAs will verify the authorization, compliance, completeness of such a request.

Upon successful verification, the Issuing CA will then issue the requested Certificate.

Certificate issuance by the Root CA SHALL require an individual in a trusted role and authorized by TunTrust to deliberately issue a direct command in order for the Root CA to perform a certificate signing operation.

## 4.3.2 NOTIFICATION TO SUBSCRIBER BY THE CA OF ISSUANCE OF CERTIFICATE

The Applicant will be notified that the Certificate is issued via email which was supplied by the Subscriber during the enrollment process and will be provided with appropriate instructions on how to obtain the Certificate. If the Certificate is presented to the Subscriber immediately, special notification may not be necessary.

#### 4.4 CERTIFICATE ACCEPTANCE

#### 4.4.1 CONDUCT CONSTITUTING CERTIFICATE ACCEPTANCE

A Subscriber that accepts a Certificate warrants to TunTrust, that all information supplied in connection with the application process and all information included in the Certificate issued to them is true, complete, and not misleading. Without limitation to the generality of the foregoing, the use of a Certificate or the reliance



Code :PL/SMI/16 Version : 02 Date : 30/04/2019 Page : 26 / 71

CL: PU

upon a Certificate signifies acceptance by that person of the terms and conditions of this CP/CPS and Subscriber Agreement (as the same may, from time to time, be amended or supplemented) by which they irrevocably agree to be bound.

TunTrust CA shall inform the Subscriber to validate that the details present in the certificate match his or her requirements. Certificates are considered accepted 30 days after the Certificate's issuance, or earlier upon use of the Certificate when evidence exists that the Subscriber used the Certificate.

#### 4.4.2 Publication of the Certificate by the CA

Refer to Section 2.1

#### 4.4.3 NOTIFICATION OF CERTIFICATE ISSUANCE BY THE CA TO OTHER ENTITIES

Other than Certificate Transparency publication, TunTrust does not notify other entities of certificate issuance.

#### 4.5 KEY PAIR AND CERTIFICATE USAGE

#### 4.5.1 SUBSCRIBER PRIVATE KEY AND CERTIFICATE USAGE

Subscribers have to protect their Private Key to avoid disclosure to third parties. TunTrust provides a Subscriber Agreement which highlights the obligations of the Subscriber with respect to Private Key protection.

Subscribers are bound to use the Certificate for its lawful and intended purposes only.

At the end of the useful life of a Private Key, Subscribers must securely delete the Private Key and any fragments that it has been split into for the purposes of backup.

#### 4.5.2 RELYING PARTY PUBLIC KEY AND CERTIFICATE USAGE

Within this CP/CPS, TunTrust provides the conditions under which Certificates may be relied upon by Relying Parties including the appropriate Certificate services available to verify Certificate validity such as CRL and/or OCSP.

In order to be a Relying Party, a Party seeking to rely on a Certificate issued by TunTrust CA agrees to and accepts the Relying Party Agreement available at <a href="https://www.tuntrust.tn/repository">https://www.tuntrust.tn/repository</a> by querying the existence or validity of; or by seeking to place or by placing reliance upon a Certificate.

Relying Parties are obliged to seek further independent assurances before any act of reliance is deemed reasonable and at a minimum must assess:

- The appropriateness of the use of the Certificate for any given purpose and that the use is not prohibited by this CP/CPS.
- That the Certificate is being used in accordance with its Key-Usage field extensions.
- That the Certificate is valid at the time of reliance by reference to OCSP or CRL Checks.

#### 4.6 CERTIFICATE RENEWAL



Code :PL/SMI/16 Version : 02 Date : 30/04/2019 Page : 27 / 71

CL: PU

Certificate Renewal means the issuance of a new Certificate without changing the Public Key or any other information in the Certificate. Certificate renewal is not supported by TunTrust.

#### 4.6.1 CIRCUMSTANCES FOR CERTIFICATE RENEWAL

Not Applicable. Certificate renewal is not supported by TunTrust.

## 4.6.2 WHO MAY REQUEST RENEWAL

Not Applicable. Certificate renewal is not supported by TunTrust.

#### 4.6.3 PROCESSING CERTIFICATE RENEWAL REQUESTS

Not Applicable. Certificate renewal is not supported by TunTrust.

#### 4.6.4 NOTIFICATION OF NEW CERTIFICATE ISSUANCE TO SUBSCRIBER

Not Applicable. Certificate renewal is not supported by TunTrust.

#### 4.6.5 CONDUCT CONSTITUTING ACCEPTANCE OF A RENEWAL CERTIFICATE

Not Applicable. Certificate renewal is not supported by TunTrust.

#### 4.6.6 Publication of the renewal Certificate by the CA

Not Applicable. Certificate renewal is not supported by TunTrust.

#### 4.6.7 NOTIFICATION OF CERTIFICATE ISSUANCE BY THE CA TO OTHER ENTITIES

Not Applicable. Certificate renewal is not supported by TunTrust.

## 4.7 CERTIFICATE RE-KEY

Not Applicable. TunTrust does not support re-key.

#### 4.7.1 CIRCUMSTANCES FOR CERTIFICATE RE-KEY

Not Applicable. TunTrust does not support re-key.

#### 4.7.2 WHO MAY REQUEST CERTIFICATION OF A NEW PUBLIC KEY

Not Applicable. TunTrust does not support re-key.

### 4.7.3 PROCESSING CERTIFICATE RE-KEYING REQUEST

Not Applicable. TunTrust does not support re-key.

#### 4.7.4 NOTIFICATION OF NEW CERTIFICATE ISSUANCE TO SUBSCRIBER

As per Section 4.3.2.

#### 4.7.5 CONDUCT CONSTITUTING ACCEPTANCE OF A RE-KEYED CERTIFICATE

Not Applicable. TunTrust does not support re-key.



Code :PL/SMI/16 Version : 02 Date : 30/04/2019

Page : 28 / 71 CL: PU

#### 4.7.6 Publication of the RE-KEYED CERTIFICATE BY THE CA

Not Applicable. TunTrust does not support re-key.

#### 4.7.7 NOTIFICATION OF CERTIFICATE ISSUANCE BY THE CA TO OTHER ENTITIES

Not Applicable. TunTrust does not support re-key.

#### 4.8 CERTIFICATE MODIFICATION

Certificate modification is the process through which a Subscriber requests a Certificate with modified subject information. TunTrust shall deem such request as an initial registration request. The requester is therefore required to start a new Certificate request.

#### 4.8.1 CIRCUMSTANCES FOR CERTIFICATE MODIFICATION

Not Applicable. TunTrust does not support Certificate modification.

#### 4.8.2 WHO MAY REQUEST CERTIFICATE MODIFICATION

Not Applicable. TunTrust does not support Certificate modification.

#### 4.8.3 PROCESSING CERTIFICATE MODIFICATION REQUESTS

Not Applicable. TunTrust does not support Certificate modification.

#### 4.8.4 NOTIFICATION OF NEW CERTIFICATE ISSUANCE TO SUBSCRIBER

Not Applicable. TunTrust does not support Certificate modification.

## 4.8.5 CONDUCT CONSTITUTING ACCEPTANCE OF MODIFIED CERTIFICATE

Not Applicable. TunTrust does not support Certificate modification.

## 4.8.6 Publication of the modified certificate by the CA

Not Applicable. TunTrust does not support Certificate modification.

#### 4.8.7 NOTIFICATION OF CERTIFICATE ISSUANCE BY THE CA TO OTHER ENTITIES

Not Applicable. TunTrust does not support Certificate modification.

#### 4.9 Certificate Revocation and Suspension

### 4.9.1 CIRCUMSTANCES OF REVOCATION

Certificate revocation is the process by which TunTrust prematurely terminates the Validity of a Certificate. TunTrust will make its certificate revocations public through the use of publicly issued CRLs and publicly available OCSP responder services.



Code :PL/SMI/16 Version : 02 Date : 30/04/2019

Page : 29 / 71 CL: PU

#### 4.9.1.1 REASONS FOR REVOKING A SUBSCRIBER CERTIFICATE

TunTrust revokes a Certificate within 24 hours if one or more of the following occurs:

- a) The Subscriber requests in writing that TunTrust revoke the Certificate;
- b) The Subscriber notifies TunTrust that the original Certificate request was not authorized and does not retroactively grant authorization;
- c) TunTrust obtains evidence that the Subscriber's Private Key corresponding to the Public Key in the Certificate suffered a Key Compromise; or
- d) TunTrust obtains evidence that the validation of domain authorization or control for any Fully-Qualified Domain Name or IP address in the Certificate should not be relied upon.

TunTrust revokes a Certificate within 5 days if one or more of the following occurs:

- a) The Certificate no longer complies with the requirements of Sections 6.1.5 and 6.1.6;
- b) TunTrust obtains evidence that the Certificate was misused;
- c) TunTrust is made aware that a Subscriber has violated one or more of its material obligations under the Subscriber Agreement;
- d) TunTrust is made aware of any circumstance indicating that use of a Fully-Qualified Domain Name or IP address in the Certificate is no longer legally permitted (e.g. a court or arbitrator has revoked a Domain Name Registrant's right to use the Domain Name, a relevant licensing or services agreement between the Domain Name Registrant and the Applicant has terminated, or the Domain Name Registrant has failed to renew the Domain Name);
- e) TunTrust is made aware that a Wildcard Certificate has been used to authenticate a fraudulently misleading subordinate Fully-Qualified Domain Name;
- f) TunTrust is made aware of a material change in the information contained in the Certificate;
- g) TunTrust is made aware that the Certificate was not issued in accordance with the Baseline Requirements or the CA's Certificate Policy or Certification Practice Statement;
- h) TunTrust determines or is made aware that any of the information appearing in the Certificate is inaccurate;
- i) TunTrust's right to issue Certificates under these Requirements expires or is revoked or terminated, unless TunTrust has made arrangements to continue maintaining the CRL/OCSP Repository;
- j) Revocation is required by this CP/CPS; or
- e) TunTrust is made aware of a demonstrated or proven method that exposes the Subscriber's Private Key to compromise, methods have been developed that can easily calculate it based on the Public Key (such as a Debian weak key), or if there is clear evidence that the specific method used to generate the Private Key was flawed.

#### 4.9.1.2 Reasons for revoking a Subordinate CA Certificate

TunTrust doesn't have any third party Subordinate CAs. The only CAs that TunTrust operates are the ones listed in section 1.3.1.

TunTrust will revoke a Subordinate CA Certificate within seven (7) days if one or more of the following occurs:

- a) The Subordinate CA requests revocation in writing;
- b) The Subordinate CA notifies TunTrust that the original Certificate request was not authorized and does not retroactively grant authorization;



Code :PL/SMI/16 Version : 02 Date : 30/04/2019

Page : 30 / 71 CL: PU

- c) TunTrust obtains evidence that the Subordinate CA's Private Key corresponding to the Public Key in the Certificate suffered a Key Compromise or no longer complies with the requirements of Sections 6.1.5 and 6.1.6,
- d) TunTrust obtains evidence that the Certificate was misused;
- e) TunTrust is made aware that the Certificate was not issued in accordance with or that Subordinate CA has not complied with the applicable CP/CPS;
- f) TunTrust determines that any of the information appearing in the Certificate is inaccurate or misleading;
- g) TunTrust or Subordinate CA ceases operations for any reason and has not made arrangements for another CA to provide revocation support for the Certificate;
- h) TunTrust or Subordinate CA's right to issue Certificates under these Requirements expires or is revoked or terminated, unless TunTrust has made arrangements to continue maintaining the CRL/OCSP Repository; or
- i) Revocation is required by TunTrust CP/CPS.

#### 4.9.2 WHO CAN REQUEST REVOCATION

TunTrust accepts authenticated requests for revocation. Authorization for revocation shall be accepted if the revocation request is received from either the Subscriber or its appropriately authorized Contract Signer. Subscribers, Relying Parties, Application Software Suppliers, and other third parties may submit Certificate Problem Reports to notify TunTrust of a suspected reasonable cause to revoke the Certificate. Problem Reports shall be submitted to the Contact Person specified in Section 1.5.2. TunTrust may also at its own discretion revoke Certificates.

#### 4.9.3 PROCEDURE FOR REVOCATION REQUEST

A revocation request should be promptly and directly communicated to TunTrust. A revocation request may be submitted using one of the following methods:

- Using TunTrust online service available at <a href="https://www.tuntrust.tn/fr/content/revocation-certificat">https://www.tuntrust.tn/fr/content/revocation-certificat</a>. In this case, the Subscriber is required to provide a challenge (that was communicated to the Subscriber upon delivery of the certificate) and the Common Name listed in the certificate. The Subscriber is also requested to provide an email address to which a notification will be sent once the certificate is revoked.
- Physical presence before a TunTrust RA operator: Either the contract signer or the legal representative of the Subscriber must be physically present at the headquarters (Section 1.5.2) of TunTrust and request the revocation of a Certificate in writing after providing a valid ID.

#### 4.9.4 REVOCATION REQUEST GRACE PERIOD

No grace period is permitted once a revocation request has been verified. TunTrust will revoke Certificates according to sections 4.9.1.

#### 4.9.5 TIME WITHIN WHICH CA MUST PROCESS THE REVOCATION REQUEST



Code :PL/SMI/16 Version : 02 Date : 30/04/2019 Page : 31 / 71

CL: PU

Within 24 hours after receiving a Certificate Problem Report, TunTrust will investigate the facts and circumstances related to the Certificate Problem Report and provide a preliminary report on its findings to both the Subscriber and the entity who filed the Certificate Problem Report.

After reviewing the facts and circumstances, TunTrust will work with the Subscriber and any entity reporting the Certificate Problem Report or other revocation-related notice to establish whether or not the certificate will be revoked, and if so, a date which TunTrust will revoke the certificate. The period from receipt of the Certificate Problem Report or revocation-related notice to published revocation does not exceed the time frame set forth in Section 4.9.1.1.

The date selected by TunTrust is based on the following criteria:

- The nature of the alleged problem (scope, context, severity, magnitude, risk of harm);
- The consequences of revocation (direct and collateral impacts to Subscribers and Relying Parties);
- The number of Certificate Problem Reports received about a particular Certificate or Subscriber;
- The entity making the complaint (for example, a complaint from a law enforcement official that a
  Web site is engaged in illegal activities should carry more weight than a complaint from a consumer
  alleging that she didn't receive the goods she ordered); and
- Tunisian laws and legislation.

#### 4.9.6 REVOCATION CHECKING REQUIREMENTS FOR RELYING PARTIES

Relying parties must validate every Certificate against the most updated CRL as minimum. Alternatively, relying parties may check Certificate status using OCSP.

## 4.9.7 CRL ISSUANCE FREQUENCY

For the status of TunTrust CA Certificates:

 TunTrust updates and reissues CRLs at least (i) once every twelve months and (ii) within 24 hours upon revoking a Subordinate CA Certificate, and the value of the nextUpdate field is not more than twelve months beyond the value of thisUpdate field.

For the status of Subscriber Certificates:

 The CRL of the issuing CAs are issued every twenty four (24) hours or whenever a Certificate is revoked. The value of the nextUpdate field must not be more than six days. The OCSP responder will report a Certificate revoked immediately after the revocation has been completed.

## 4.9.8 MAXIMUM LATENCY FOR CRLS

The CRLs of TunTrust CA are issued according to section 4.9.7 and published in a timely manner. The revocation shall become effective immediately upon its publication.

## 4.9.9 On-Line Revocation/Status Checking Availability

TunTrust supports OCSP responses in addition to CRLs. Response times are generally no longer than 5 seconds under normal network operating conditions.

TunTrust OCSP responses conform to RFC6960 and/or RFC5019. OCSP responses are signed by an OCSP Responder whose Certificate is signed by the CA that issued the Certificate whose revocation status is being



Code :PL/SMI/16 Version : 02 Date : 30/04/2019 Page : 32 / 71

CL: PU

checked. OCSP signing Certificate contains an extension of type id-pkix-ocsp-nocheck, as defined by RFC6960.

#### 4.9.10 ON-LINE REVOCATION CHECKING REQUIREMENTS

Relying Parties must confirm revocation information otherwise all warranties become void.

For the status of Subscriber Certificates:

 TunTrust updates information provided via an OCSP at least every four days. OCSP responses from this service will not exceed an expiration time of ten days.

For the status of Subordinate CA Certificates:

 TunTrust updates information provided via an OCSP at least (i) every twelve months and (ii) upon revoking a Subordinate CA Certificate.

OCSP Responders that receive a request for status of a Certificate that has not been issued, do not respond with a "good" status for such Certificates.

TunTrust requires OCSP requests to contain the following data:

- Protocol version
- Service request
- Target Certificate identifier

## 4.9.11 OTHER FORMS OF REVOCATION ADVERTISEMENTS AVAILABLE

TunTrust does not employ any method other than OCSP and CRL for advertising revocation status.

## 4.9.12 SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS RELATED TO KEY COMPROMISE

Should a Private Key become compromised, the related Certificate shall immediately be revoked. Should the private CA key become compromised, all Certificates issued by that CA shall be revoked.

#### 4.9.13 CIRCUMSTANCES FOR SUSPENSION

No suspension of Certificates is performed by TunTrust.

## 4.9.14 WHO CAN REQUEST SUSPENSION

No suspension of Certificates is performed by TunTrust.

#### 4.9.15 PROCEDURE FOR SUSPENSION REQUEST

No suspension of Certificates is performed by TunTrust.

#### 4.9.16 LIMITS ON SUSPENSION PERIOD

No suspension of Certificates is performed by TunTrust.



Code :PL/SMI/16 Version : 02 Date : 30/04/2019

Page: 33 / 71 CL: PU

#### 4.10 CERTIFICATE STATUS SERVICES

#### 4.10.1 OPERATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS

TunTrust provides a Certificate status service either in the form of a CRL distribution point or an OCSP responder or both in the Certificates. TunTrust does not remove revocation entries on CRL or OCSP until after the Expiry Date of the revoked Certificate.

#### 4.10.2 SERVICE AVAILABILITY

TunTrust operates and maintains its CRL and OCSP capability with resources sufficient to provide a response time of five seconds or less under normal operating conditions. TunTrust maintains an online 24x7 Repository that application software can use to automatically check the current status of all unexpired Certificates issued by TunTrust. Outside system maintenance windows, system failure or other factors which are not under the control of TunTrust CA, the TunTrust CA shall make best endeavors to ensure that the uptime of these services exceeds 99,0%.

TunTrust maintains a continuous 24x7 ability to respond internally to a high-priority Certificate Problem Report, and where appropriate, forward such a complaint to law enforcement authorities, and/or revoke a Certificate that is the subject of such a complaint.

#### 4.10.3 OPERATIONAL FEATURES

No stipulation.

## 4.11 END OF SUBSCRIPTION

Subscribers may end their subscription to Certificate services by having their Certificate revoked or naturally letting it expire.

## **4.12 KEY ESCROW AND RECOVERY**

The private keys for each CA Certificate were generated and are stored in Hardware Security Modules (HSM) and are backed up but not escrowed.

### 4.12.1 KEY ESCROW AND RECOVERY POLICY AND PRACTICES

TunTrust CA key-recovery is based on HSM standard key-backup where the keys in the backup are protected with encryption mechanism. All HSM backups and administrator smartcards are stored in a safety vault. Only persons performing trusted roles have the access to the safety vault.

TunTrust does not store copies of Subscriber private keys; Subscriber's key back-up, escrow and key recovery are not possible.

## 4.12.2 Session key encapsulation and recovery policy and practices

No Stipulation.



Code :PL/SMI/16 Version : 02 Date : 30/04/2019

Page: 34 / 71 CL: PU

## 5 FACILITY, MANAGEMENT, AND OPERATIONAL CONTROLS

This section of the CP/CPS outlines the security policy, physical and logical access control mechanisms, service levels and personnel policy in use by TunTrust to provide trustworthy and reliable CA operations.

TunTrust has implemented a Security Policy, which supports the security requirements of this CP/CPS. Compliance with these policies is included in independent audit requirements described in section 8.

TunTrust carries out a risk assessment to evaluate business risks and determine the necessary security requirements and operational procedures. This risk analysis performed with the full support and collaboration of all component services providers and is regularly reviewed and revised if necessary. This risk analysis is available as an internal document.

TunTrust, acting as TSP including activities, provides direction on information security through its Board of Directors, responsible for defining the information security policy and ensuring publication and communication of the policy to all personnel who are impacted by the policy.

This information security policy is implemented with the full support and collaboration of all component services providers and is regularly reviewed and revised if necessary. Appropriate systems, infrastructures and measures for quality and information security management are implemented and maintained at all times. Any changes that would impact on the level of security provided must be approved by TunTrust through its TunTrust Board of Directors. The TunTrust information security policy as well as documentation on security controls and operating procedures is available as separate and internal documents.

TunTrust ensures implementation and maintains appropriate level of protection to its assets and information systems. For this purpose TunTrust maintains an inventory of all information assets and assigns a classification for the protection requirements to those assets consistent with the risk analysis.

## **5.1** Physical controls

### 5.1.1 SITE LOCATION AND CONSTRUCTION

TunTrust CA and RA operations are conducted within a physically protected environment that deters, prevents, and detects unauthorized use of, access to, or disclosure of sensitive information.

## **5.1.2** PHYSICAL ACCESS

TunTrust protects its equipment from unauthorized access and implements physical controls to reduce the risk of equipment tampering. The secure parts of TunTrust CA hosting facilities are protected using physical access controls with biometric scanners or card access systems making them accessible only to appropriately authorized individuals.

The buildings housing TunTrust CA systems have security personnel on duty full time (24 hours per day, 365 days per year). The exterior and internal passageways of the buildings are under constant video surveillance. TunTrust securely stores all removable media and paper containing sensitive plain-text information related to its CA operations in secure containers in accordance with its Data Classification Procedure.



Code :PL/SMI/16 Version : 02 Date : 30/04/2019

Page : 35 / 71 CL: PU

#### 5.1.3 POWER AND AIR CONDITIONING

TunTrust CA operates within a data center that has primary and secondary power supplies to ensure continuous, uninterrupted access to electric power. Redundant backup power is provided by battery uninterrupted power supplies (UPS) and one generator.

TunTrust data center is equipped with heating/ventilation/air conditioning systems to control temperature and relative humidity.

#### 5.1.4 WATER EXPOSURES

TunTrust has taken reasonable precautions to minimize the impact of water exposure to its Data Center.

#### 5.1.5 FIRE PREVENTION AND PROTECTION

TunTrust has taken reasonable precautions to prevent and extinguish fires or other damaging exposure to flame or smoke. TunTrust's fire prevention and protection measures have been designed to comply with local fire safety regulations.

#### 5.1.6 MEDIA STORAGE

All media containing production software and data, audit, archive, or backup information are stored within TunTrust facilities with appropriate physical and logical access controls designed to limit access to authorized personnel and protect such media from accidental damage such as water, fire, and electromagnetic.

## 5.1.7 WASTE DISPOSAL

Sensitive documents and materials are shredded before disposal. Media used to collect or transmit sensitive information are rendered unreadable before disposal. Cryptographic devices are physically destroyed or zeroized in accordance to the manufacturer s' guidance prior to disposal.

#### 5.1.8 OFF-SITE BACKUP

TunTrust performs routine backups of critical system data, and other sensitive information. The backed up data are stored in a physically secured offsite locations.

## **5.2** PROCEDURAL CONTROLS

### **5.2.1** TRUSTED ROLES

TunTrust personnel in trusted roles include, but are not limited to, CA and system administration personnel and personnel involved with customer support and vetting. An additional role to TunTrust is the Auditor role, performed by TunTrust's internal auditors.

The functions and duties performed by persons in trusted roles are distributed so that one person alone cannot circumvent security measures or subvert the security and trustworthiness of TunTrust.



Code :PL/SMI/16 Version : 02 Date : 30/04/2019 Page : 36 / 71

CL: PU

Operator	Employees responsible for routine certification services such as customer services, document control, processes relating to Certificate registration, generation and revocation. They are also responsible for interacting with Applicants and Subscribers, managing the Certificate request queue and completing the Certificate approval checklist as identity vetting items are successfully completed.  They serve in a trusted role.
PKI Administrator	The PKI Administrator is a trusted role. This administrator is responsible for the installation and configuration of PKI components (CA, RA,).
System	The System Administrator is a trusted role. This administrator is responsible for the
Administrator	installation and configuration of the system hardware, including servers and different components of the PKI. The System Administrator is also responsible for keeping systems updated with software patches and other maintenance needed for system stability and recoverability.
Application	The Application Administrator is a trusted role. This administrator is responsible for
Administrator	the installation, configuration and operations of the applications related to TunTrust.
Physical and	The Physical and Logical Security Officer is a trusted role. This role is responsible for
Logical Security	the installation and configuration of the physical security platforms (access control,
Officer	video surveillance, IDS,) and the logical security platforms (firewalls, WAF, routers, network configuration).
Auditor	The Auditor is a trusted role. This role is authorized to view archives and audit logs of the trustworthy system.
Key/Ceremony	The Key/Ceremony Manager is a trusted role. This role is responsible of conducting
Manager	the key ceremonies.

### **5.2.2** Number of Persons required Per task

Handling of CA Private Keys (throughout the entire CA key lifecycle) requires the involvement of at least two trusted persons. Physical and logical access controls exist for the key activation material in order to maintain multi-party control over the Hardware Security Modules containing CA Private Keys.

Shareholders use HSM Smartcard for authentication. The HSM itself enforces dual control based on the HSM smartcards for different functions. The number of needed HSM-smartcards (m) of the total number of produced HSM-smartcards (n) will be:

- (a) Key generation of Root CA = 3 of 6
- (b) Signing key activation of Root CA = 3 of 6
- (c) Private key backup and restore of Root CA = 3 of 6
- (d) Key generation of Issuing CA = 2 of 6
- (e) Signing key activation of Issuing CA = 2 of 6
- (f) Private key backup and restore of Issuing CA = 3 of 6



Code :PL/SMI/16 Version : 02 Date : 30/04/2019

Page : 37 / 71 CL: PU

#### 5.2.3 IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION FOR EACH ROLE

Before appointing a person to a trusted role, TunTrust performs a background check. Each role described above is identified and authenticated in a manner to guarantee that the right person has the right role to support the CA.

#### **5.2.4** ROLES REQUIRING SEPARATION OF DUTIES

Roles requiring a separation of duties include:

- 1. Those performing authorization functions such as the verification of information in Certificate applications and approvals of Certificate applications and revocation requests,
- 2. Those performing physical and logical security functions;
- 3. Those performing audit;
  Those performing duties related to system administration.

To accomplish this separation of duties, TunTrust specifically designates individuals to the trusted roles defined in Section 5.2.1 above.

TunTrust's systems identify and authenticate individuals acting in trusted roles, restrict an individual from assuming multiple roles, and prevent any individual from having more than one identity.

#### 5.3 Personnel controls

#### 5.3.1 QUALIFICATIONS, EXPERIENCE, AND CLEARANCE REQUIREMENTS

Prior to the engagement of any person, whether as an employee, agent, or an independent contractor, TunTrust verifies the identity and trustworthiness of such person. TunTrust employs a sufficient number of personnel that possess the expert knowledge, experience and qualifications necessary for the offered services, as appropriate to the job function.

TunTrust personnel fulfill the requirement through expert knowledge, experience and qualifications with formal training and education, actual experience, or a combination of the two. Trusted roles and responsibilities, as specified in Section 5.2.1 are documented in job descriptions. TunTrust personnel (both temporary and permanent) have job descriptions defined from the view point of separation of duties and least privilege, determining position sensitivity based on the duties and access levels, background screening and employee training and awareness.

#### **5.3.2** BACKGROUND CHECK PROCEDURES

All TunTrust personnel in trusted roles are free from conflict of interests that might prejudice the impartiality of the CA operations. TunTrust does not appoint to a trusted role any person who is known to have a conviction for a serious crime or another offence if such conviction affects his/her suitability for the position.

Personnel do not have access to the trusted functions until any necessary checks are completed and results analyzed. All persons filling trusted roles shall be selected on the basis of loyalty, trustworthiness, and integrity, and shall be subject to background investigation where permitted by law.



Code :PL/SMI/16 Version : 02 Date : 30/04/2019 Page : 38 / 71

CL: PU

Any use of information revealed by background checks by TunTrust shall be in compliance with applicable laws in Tunisia.

#### **5.3.3** TRAINING REQUIREMENTS

TunTrust provides all personnel performing information verification duties with skills-training that covers basic Public Key Infrastructure knowledge, authentication and vetting policies and procedures (including this CP/CPS), common threats to the information verification process (including phishing and social engineering), and the CA/B Forum requirements.

TunTrust maintains records of such training and ensures that personnel entrusted with Validation Specialist duties maintain a skill level that enables them to perform such duties satisfactorily.

TunTrust documents that each Validation Specialist possesses the skills required by a task before allowing the Validation Specialist to perform that task.

#### **5.3.4** RETRAINING FREQUENCY AND REQUIREMENTS

All personnel in Trusted Role maintain skill levels consistent with TunTrust's training and performance programs.

Individuals responsible for trusted roles are aware of changes in TunTrust CA or RA operations, as applicable. Any significant change to the operations has a training (awareness) plan, and the execution of such plan is documented.

TunTrust provides information security and privacy training at least once a year to all employees.

# **5.3.5** Job rotation frequency and sequence

Job rotation of employees is done as necessity arises, depending on the needs of the organization, or by request of an individual employee.

### 5.3.6 SANCTIONS FOR UNAUTHORIZED ACTIONS

Appropriate disciplinary sanctions are applied to personnel violating provisions and policies within the applicable CP/CPS or CA related operational procedures.

#### **5.3.7** INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR REQUIREMENTS

Contractor personnel employed for TunTrust CA operations are subject to the same process, procedures, assessment, security control and training as permanent CA personnel.

#### 5.3.8 DOCUMENTATION SUPPLIED TO PERSONNEL

TunTrust makes available to its personnel this CP/CPS. Other technical, operational and administrative documents (e.g., administrator manuals, user manuals, etc.) are provided in order for the trusted personnel to perform their duties.

Documentation is maintained identifying all personnel who received training and the level of training completed.



Code :PL/SMI/16 Version : 02 Date : 30/04/2019 Page : 39 / 71

CL: PU

#### 5.4 AUDIT LOGGING PROCEDURES

#### **5.4.1** Types of Events Recorded

TunTrust records details of the actions taken to process a Certificate request and to issue a Certificate, including all information generated and documentation received in connection with the Certificate request; the time and date; and the personnel involved. TunTrust makes these records available to its Qualified Auditor.

- 1. CA key lifecycle management events, including:
  - a. Key generation, backup, storage, recovery, archival, and destruction; and
  - b. Cryptographic device lifecycle management events.
- 2. CA and Subscriber Certificate lifecycle management events, including:
  - a. Certificate requests and revocation;
  - b. All verification activities stipulated in this CP/CPS;
  - c. Date, time, phone number used, persons spoken to, and end results of verification telephone calls;
  - d. Acceptance and rejection of Certificate requests;
  - e. Issuance of Certificates; and
  - f. Generation of Certificate Revocation Lists and OCSP entries.
- 3. Security events, including:
  - a. Successful and unsuccessful PKI system access attempts;
  - b. PKI and security system actions performed;
  - c. Security profile changes;
  - d. System crashes, hardware failures, and other anomalies;
  - e. Firewall and router activities; and
  - f. Entries to and exits from the CA facility.

Log entries include the following elements:

- Date and time of entry;
- Identity of the person making the journal entry; and
- Description of the entry.

# 5.4.2 Frequency of processing log

Audit logs are reviewed periodically for any evidence of malicious activity as detailed in the internal procedure of Log Management. A human review is also performed on application and system logs at least once every 30 days to validate the integrity of logging processes and ensure that monitoring, logging, alerting, and log integrity-verification functions are operating properly.

# 5.4.3 RETENTION PERIOD FOR AUDIT LOG



Code :PL/SMI/16 Version : 02 Date : 30/04/2019 Page : 40 / 71

CL: PU

TunTrust retains any audit logs generated for at least seven years. TunTrust makes these audit logs available to its Qualified Auditor upon request.

#### 5.4.4 PROTECTION OF AUDIT LOG

The events are logged in a way that they cannot be deleted or destroyed for any period of time that they are retained.

Access and security controls are in place to prevent alteration and detect tampering with the audit log and to ensure that only individuals with authorized trusted access are able to perform any operations without modifying integrity, authenticity and confidentiality of the data.

#### 5.4.5 AUDIT LOG BACKUP PROCEDURES

Audit logs are backed-up in a secure location, under the control of an authorized trusted role, and separated from their component source generation. Audit log backup is protected to the same degree as originals.

### 5.4.6 AUDIT COLLECTION SYSTEM (INTERNAL VS. EXTERNAL)

Automated audit data is generated and recorded at the application, network and operating system level. Manually generated audit data is recorded by TunTrust personnel.

#### 5.4.7 NOTIFICATION TO EVENT-CAUSING SUBJECT

No stipulation.

# 5.4.8 VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS

TunTrust performs annual risk assessments that:

- Identifies foreseeable internal and external threats that could result in unauthorized access, disclosure, misuse, alteration, or destruction of any Certificate Data or Certificate Management Process;
- 2. Assesses the likelihood and potential damage of these threats, taking into consideration the sensitivity of the Certificate Data and Certificate Management Processes; and
- 3. Assesses the sufficiency of the policies, procedures, information systems, technology, and other arrangements that TunTrust has in place to counter such threats.

TunTrust also undergoes regular vulnerability assessment and penetration testing by an external third party. Assessments cover all TunTrust assets related to Certificate issuance, products and services and focus on internal and external threats that could result in unauthorized access, tampering, modification, alteration or destruction of the Certificate issuance process. TunTrust also performs internal vulnerability assessments on a regular basis.

### 5.5 RECORDS ARCHIVAL

# **5.5.1** Types of records archived



Code :PL/SMI/16 Version : 02 Date : 30/04/2019

Page : 41 / 71 CL: PU

The following records are archived:

- a daily backup of any information that this CA and its subsidiaries produce;
- Registration information of end entities.

#### 5.5.2 RETENTION PERIOD FOR ARCHIVE

TunTrust retains all documentation relating to Certificate applications and the verification thereof, and all Certificates and revocation thereof, for at least 20 years after any Certificate based on that documentation ceases to be valid. Event logs specified in Section 5.4 are archived for seven years after their generation.

#### **5.5.3** Protection of archive

Archive protections ensure that only authorized trusted access is able to make operations without modifying integrity, authenticity and confidentiality of the data.

#### **5.5.4** ARCHIVE BACKUP PROCEDURES

No stipulation.

#### 5.5.5 REQUIREMENTS FOR TIME-STAMPING OF RECORDS

TunTrust ensures that the precise time of archiving all events, records and documents listed in section 5.4 and 5.5 is recorded. This is accomplished through accurate NTP synchronization of all systems.

# 5.5.6 ARCHIVE COLLECTION SYSTEM (INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL)

Archive information is collected internally by TunTrust.

# 5.5.7 PROCEDURES TO OBTAIN AND VERIFY ARCHIVE INFORMATION

No stipulation.

### **5.6** Key Changeover

Key changeover procedures enable the smooth transition from expiring CA Certificates to new CA Certificates. Towards the end of the CA Private Key's lifetime, TunTrust ceases using its expiring CA Private Key to sign Certificates (two years prior to its expiration) and uses the old Private Key only to sign CRLs. A new CA signing key pair is commissioned and all subsequently issued Certificates and CRLs are signed with the new private signing key. Both the old and the new Key Pairs may be concurrently active. This key changeover process helps minimize any adverse effects from CA Certificate expiration. The corresponding new CA public key Certificate is provided to Subscribers and relying parties through the delivery methods detailed in Section 6.1.4.

# 5.7 COMPROMISE AND DISASTER RECOVERY

#### 5.7.1 INCIDENT AND COMPROMISE HANDLING PROCEDURES



Code :PL/SMI/16 Version : 02 Date : 30/04/2019 Page : 42 / 71

CL: PU

TunTrust has an Incident Response Procedure and a Disaster Recovery Plan. TunTrust documents a business continuity procedure and disaster recovery plan designed to notify and reasonably protect Application Software Suppliers, Subscribers, and Relying Parties in the event of a disaster, security compromise, or business failure.

TunTrust does not disclose business continuity plans to Subscribers, Relying Parties, or to Application Software Suppliers, but will provide business continuity procedure and the risk treatment plan to the TunTrust auditors upon request.

TunTrust annually tests, reviews, and updates these procedures. The business continuity procedure includes:

- 1. The conditions for activating the plan,
- 2. Emergency procedures,
- 3. Fallback procedures,
- 4. Resumption procedures,
- 5. A maintenance schedule for the plan;
- 6. Awareness and education requirements;
- 7. The responsibilities of the individuals;
- 8. Recovery time objective (RTO);
- 9. Regular testing of contingency plans.
- 10. TunTrust's plan to maintain or restore the CA's business operations in a timely manner following interruption to or failure of critical business processes
- 11. A requirement to store critical cryptographic materials (i.e., secure cryptographic device and activation materials) at an alternate location;
- 12. What constitutes an acceptable system outage and recovery time
- 13. How frequently backup copies of essential business information and software are taken;
- 14. The distance of recovery facilities to the CA's main site; and
- 15. Procedures for securing its facility to the extent possible during the period of time following a disaster and prior to restoring a secure environment either at the original or a remote site.

### 5.7.2 COMPUTING RESOURCES, SOFTWARE, AND/OR DATA ARE CORRUPTED

If any equipment is damaged or rendered inoperative but the Private Keys are not destroyed, the operation is reestablished as quickly as possible, giving priority to the ability to generate Certificate status information according to the TunTrust's disaster recovery plan.

### 5.7.3 ENTITY PRIVATE KEY COMPROMISE PROCEDURES

In the event that a TunTrust CA private key has been or is suspected to have been compromised, TunTrust personnel will immediately convene an emergency Incident Response Team to assess the situation and to determine the degree and scope of the incident and take appropriate action. The following actions outline as follows:

- 1. Collect all information related to the incident (and if the event is ongoing, ensure that all data are being captured and recorded);
- 2. Begin investigating the incident and determine the degree and scope;
- 3. The Incident Response Team determines the course of action or strategy that should be taken (and in the case of Private Key compromise, determining the scope of Certificates that must be revoked);



Code :PL/SMI/16 Version : 02 Date : 30/04/2019

Page : 43 / 71 CL: PU

- 4. Contact law enforcement, and other interested parties and activate any other appropriate additional security measures;
- 5. Monitor system, continue the investigation, ensure that all data is still being recorded as evidence and make a forensic copy of data collected;
- 6. Isolate, contain and stabilize the system, applying any possible short-term fixes needed to return the system to a normal operating state;
- 7. Prepare an incident report that analyzes the cause of the incident and implement a long term solutions.

A new CA Key Pair should be generated and a new CA Certificate should be signed in accordance with the procedures outlined in Section 6 (Technical Security Controls) of this CP/CPS.

#### 5.7.4 BUSINESS CONTINUITY CAPABILITIES AFTER A DISASTER

TunTrust operates two backup sites, whose purpose is to ensure continuity of operations in the event of failure of the primary facility or site and mitigate the effects of any kind of natural or man-made disaster. The Disaster Recovery Plan is regularly tested, verified and updated to be operational in the event of a disaster. The TunTrust operation is designed to restore full service within six (6) hours of main site system failure.

# 5.8 CA OR RA TERMINATION

In case of termination of CA operations for any reason whatsoever, TunTrust will provide timely notice and transfer of responsibilities to succeeding entities, maintenance of records, and remedies. Before terminating its own CA activities, TunTrust will where possible take the following steps:

- Revoke all Certificates that are still un-revoked or un-expired at the end of the ninety (90)-day,
- Notice period without seeking Subscriber's consent.
- Give timely notice of revocation to each affected Subscriber.
- Make reasonable arrangements to preserve its records according to the applicable CP/CPS.
- Reserve its right to provide succession arrangements for the re-issuance of Certificates by a successor CA that has all relevant permissions to do so and complies with all necessary rules, while its operation is at least as secure as TunTrust is.

The requirements of this article may be varied by contract, to the extent that such modifications affect only the contracting part.

# 6 TECHNICAL SECURITY CONTROLS

# **6.1** Key pair generation and installation

# 6.1.1 KEY PAIR GENERATION

#### 6.1.1.1 CA KEY PAIR GENERATION

For the Root CA Key Pairs, TunTrust performs the following controls:



Code :PL/SMI/16 Version : 02 Date : 30/04/2019

Page : 44 / 71 CL: PU

- 1. prepares and follows a Key Generation Script,
- 2. has a Qualified Auditor witness the Root CA Key Pair generation process or records a video of the entire Root CA Key Pair generation process, and
- 3. has a Qualified Auditor issue a report opining that the CA followed its key ceremony during its Key and Certificate generation process and the controls used to ensure the integrity and confidentiality of the Key Pair.

In all cases, TunTrust performs the following controls:

- 1. generates the keys in a physically secured environment as described in this CP/CPS;
- 2. generates the CA keys using personnel in trusted roles under the principles of multiple person control and split knowledge;
- 3. generates the CA keys within cryptographic modules meeting the applicable technical and business requirements as disclosed in this CP/CPS;
- 4. logs its CA key generation activities; and
- 5. maintains effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that the Private Key was generated and protected in conformance with the procedures described in this CP/CPS and (if applicable) its Key Generation Script.

### 6.1.1.2 RA KEY PAIR GENERATION

No stipulation.

## 6.1.1.3 SUBSCRIBER KEY PAIR GENERATION

For Subscriber keys generated by TunTrust, Key generation is performed in a secure cryptographic device that meets FIPS 140-2 using key generation algorithm and key size as specified in Section 6.1.5 and 6.1.6.

TunTrust rejects a Certificate request if the requested Public Key does not meet the requirements set forth in Sections 6.1.5 and 6.1.6 or if it has a known weak Private Key (such as a Debian weak key, see http://wiki.debian.org/SSLkeys).

### 6.1.2 PRIVATE KEY DELIVERY TO SUBSCRIBER

As regards to TLS/SSL Certificates, Applicants are solely responsible for the generation of the private keys used in their Certificate Requests. TunTrust does not provide SSL key generation, escrow, recovery or backup facilities.

#### 6.1.3 PUBLIC KEY DELIVERY TO CERTIFICATE ISSUER

In case of SSL Certificate, Subscribers generate Key Pairs and submit the Public Key to TunTrust in a CSR as part of the Certificate request process. The Subscriber's signature on the request is authenticated prior to issuing the Certificate.

#### 6.1.4 CA PUBLIC KEY DELIVERY TO RELYING PARTIES



Code :PL/SMI/16 Version : 02 Date : 30/04/2019 Page : 45 / 71

CL: PU

TunTrust ensures that its Public Keys are delivered to Relying Parties in such a way as to prevent substitution attacks. Commercial web browsers and platform operators are encouraged to embed Root Certificate Public Keys into their root stores and operating systems. Issuing CA Public Keys are delivered to the Subscriber in the form of a chain of Certificates or via a Repository operated by TunTrust and referenced within the profile of the issued Certificate through AIA (Authority Information Access).

# 6.1.5 KEY SIZES

TunTrust Certificates meet the following requirements for algorithm type and key size:

### **Root CA Certificate:**

	Value
Digest algorithm	SHA-256
RSA modulus size (bits)	4096

#### **Issuing CA Certificates:**

	Value
Digest algorithm	SHA-256
RSA modulus size (bits)	4096

#### **Subscriber Certificates:**

	Value
Digest algorithm	SHA-256
RSA modulus size (bits)	2048

#### 6.1.6 Public key parameters generation and quality checking

TunTrust generates Key Pairs in accordance with FIPS 186 and uses reasonable techniques to validate the suitability of Public Keys presented by Subscribers. Known weak keys are tested for and rejected at the point of submission.

# 6.1.7 KEY USAGE PURPOSES (AS PER X.509 V3 KEY USAGE FIELD)

TunTrust sets key usage of Certificates depending on their proposed field of application via the v3 Key Usage Field for X.509 v3 (see Section 7.1).

Private Keys corresponding to Root Certificates are not used to sign Certificates except in the following cases:

- Self-signed Certificates to represent the Root CA itself;
- Certificates for Subordinate CAs and Cross Certificates; and
- Certificates for OCSP Response verification.

# 6.2 PRIVATE KEY PROTECTION AND CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE ENGINEERING CONTROLS

TunTrust implements physical and logical safeguards to prevent unauthorized Certificate issuance. Protection of the CA Private Key outside the validated system or device specified above consists of physical



Code :PL/SMI/16 Version : 02 Date : 30/04/2019 Page : 46 / 71

CL: PU

security and encryption, implemented in a manner that prevents disclosure of the CA Private Key. TunTrust encrypts its Private Key with an algorithm and key-length that, according to the state of the art, are capable of withstanding cryptanalytic attacks for the residual life of the encrypted key or key part.

#### 6.2.1 CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE STANDARDS AND CONTROLS

The following list shows how the requirements for the different users of hardware cryptographic modules are implemented:

- Root CA keys : The HSM used for CA keys meets FIPS 140-1 level 3 and EAL4+ requirements.
- Issuing CAs keys: The HSM used for CA keys meets FIPS 140-1 level 3 and EAL4+ requirements.
   Subscriber keys (SSL Certificate): The Subscriber is fully responsible for its private keys.

## 6.2.2 PRIVATE KEY (N OUT OF M) MULTI-PERSON CONTROL

TunTrust has implemented technical and procedural mechanisms that require the participation of multiple trusted individuals to perform sensitive TunTrust CA cryptographic operations.

A threshold number of Secret Shares (m) out of the total number of Secret Shares created and distributed for a particular hardware cryptographic module (n) is required to activate a TunTrust CA private key stored on the module.

The following list shows how multi-person controls are implemented:

- Root CA keys : Root CA keys can only be accessed on the physical and on the logical level by adhering to '3 out of 6' control, meaning that 3 of the 6 persons are present.
- Issuing CAs keys: Management access to these keys is only possible using '4-eye' principle (2 out of
   6). Once the issuing CA is operable, signing operations can be authorized by a single RA operator.
- Subscriber keys: The Subscriber has single-person control of the Subscriber keys.

#### **6.2.3** Private key escrow

TunTrust does not escrow Private Keys for any reason.

#### 6.2.4 PRIVATE KEY BACKUP

TunTrust creates backup copies of CA private keys for routine recovery and disaster recovery purposes. Such keys are stored in encrypted form within hardware cryptographic modules and associated key storage devices under the same multi-person control as the original Private Key. Cryptographic modules used for private key storage meet the requirements of this CP/CPS. Private keys are copied to backup hardware cryptographic modules in accordance with this CP/CPS.

TunTrust does not backup Subscriber Private Keys for SSL Certificates

### 6.2.5 PRIVATE KEY ARCHIVAL

TunTrust does not archive Subscriber Private Keys.

#### 6.2.6 PRIVATE KEY TRANSFER INTO OR FROM A CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE



Code :PL/SMI/16 Version : 02 Date : 30/04/2019 Page : 47 / 71

CL: PU

TunTrust CA Private Keys are generated, activated and stored in Hardware Security Modules.

If TunTrust becomes aware that a Subordinate CA's Private Key has been communicated to an unauthorized person or an organization not affiliated with the Subordinate CA, then TunTrust will revoke all Certificates that include the Public Key corresponding to the communicated Private Key.

#### 6.2.7 PRIVATE KEY STORAGE ON CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE

TunTrust stores the CAs Private Keys on a FIPS 140-2 level 3 Hardware Security module which includes requirements to protect the Private Key and other assets against known threats.

### 6.2.8 METHOD OF ACTIVATING PRIVATE KEY

TunTrust is responsible for activating the Private Key in accordance with the instructions and documentation provided by the manufacturer of the hardware security module.

The following list shows how private keys are activated:

- Root CA keys: The Root CA keys are activated with three user key (physical) and three user PIN (knowledge).
- Issuing CA keys: The Issuing CA keys are activated with two user key (physical) and two user PIN (knowledge).
- Subscriber keys: The Subscriber private key is activated with a user PIN (knowledge).

#### 6.2.9 METHOD OF DEACTIVATING PRIVATE KEY

Access to TunTrust CA private keys is automatically de-activated upon logging off the system and shall be logged off until following use. The method specified in Section 6.2.8 is operated for re-activation of private key.

#### 6.2.10 METHOD OF DESTROYING PRIVATE KEY

TunTrust Private Keys are destroyed when they are no longer needed or when the Certificates to which they correspond have expired or have been revoked. Destroying Private Keys means that:

- TunTrust destroys all associated CA secret activation data in such a manner that no information can be used to deduce any part of the Private Key.
- TunTrust initializes the Hardware Security Module. In cases when this initialization procedure fails,
   TunTrust will physically destroy the device to remove the ability to extract any private key.

Subscriber keys: TunTrust does not generate private keys for SSL Certificates.

### 6.2.11 CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE RATING

See section 6.2.1.

### 6.3 OTHER ASPECTS OF KEY PAIR MANAGEMENT



Code :PL/SMI/16 Version : 02 Date : 30/04/2019 Page : 48 / 71

CL: PU

#### 6.3.1 PUBLIC KEY ARCHIVAL

All Certificates, and therefore the public keys of all Subscribers and all CAs, are stored on-line in a database. This database is replicated to all servers in the CA cluster. This database is also part of the daily backup.

#### 6.3.2 CERTIFICATE OPERATIONAL PERIODS AND KEY PAIR USAGE PERIODS

The usage periods for Certificates issued by the CAs are as follows:

- The TunTrust Root CA is valid for 25 years.
- The issuing CAs Certificates are issued for a maximum life time of 20 years.
- The end-user Certificates can have a lifetime of 1 or 2 years.

TunTrust complies with the Baseline Requirements with respect to the maximum Validity Period.

### **6.4** ACTIVATION DATA

#### 6.4.1 ACTIVATION DATA GENERATION AND INSTALLATION

TunTrust activates the cryptographic module containing its CA Private Keys according to the specifications of the hardware manufacturer. This method has been evaluated as meeting the requirements of FIPS 140-2 Level 3. The cryptographic hardware is held under multiple person control as explained in Section 5.2.2.

All TunTrust personnel and Subscribers are instructed to use strong passwords and to protect PINs and passwords. TunTrust employees are required to create non-dictionary, alphanumeric passwords with a minimum length and to change their passwords on a regular basis.

#### **6.4.2** ACTIVATION DATA PROTECTION

TunTrust CA activation data is protected from disclosure through a combination of cryptographic and physical access control mechanisms. TunTrust CA activation data is stored on smart cards.

The Subscriber shall memorize the activation credentials (PIN, password) and not share them with anyone else.

# 6.4.3 OTHER ASPECTS OF ACTIVATION DATA

TunTrust CA activation data are only held by TunTrust personnel in trusted roles.

## **6.5** COMPUTER SECURITY CONTROLS

The CA servers are protected by external firewalls that filter out all unwanted traffic. Additionally, the CA systems are hardened and equipped with a high-security operating system. The access to the system is granted only over secure and restricted protocols using strong public key authentication.

### **6.5.1** Specific computer security technical requirements



Code :PL/SMI/16 Version : 02 Date : 30/04/2019

Page: 49 / 71

CL: PU

TunTrust uses a layered security approach to ensure the security and integrity of the computers used to run the CA software. The following controls ensure the security of TunTrust operated computer systems:

- Hardened operating system.
- Software packages are only installed from a trusted software repository.
- TunTrust CA production network is logically separated from other components. This separation
  prevents network access except through defined application processes. TunTrust uses firewalls to
  protect the production network from external intrusion and limit the nature and source of network
  activities that may access production systems.
- Authentication and authorization for all functions.
- Strong authentication and role-based access control for all vital functions.
- Monitoring and auditing of all activities.

TunTrust enforces multi-factor authentication for all accounts capable of directly causing Certificate issuance.

# **6.5.2** COMPUTER SECURITY RATING

TunTrust has established a security framework which covers and governs the technical aspects of its computer security.

The systems themselves and the services running on these systems are subject to thorough reviews and testing (including penetration testing).

In order to make its environment more secure and to keep it on a state-of-the-art security level, TunTrust operates a vulnerability management process which includes monitoring of supplier security alerts.

The technical aspects of computer security are subject to periodic audits.

### **6.6** Life cycle technical controls

## **6.6.1** System development controls

TunTrust has mechanisms in place to control and monitor the acquisition and development of its CA systems.

Change control processes consist of change control data entries that are processed, logged and tracked for any non-security-related changes to CA systems, equipment and software. Change requests require the approval of a committee.

In this manner, TunTrust can verify whether a change to the system has been properly evaluated for risk mitigation and authorized by management.

All hardware and software are shipped under standard conditions with controls in place to ensure delivery of the component directly to a trusted employee who ensures that the equipment is installed without opportunity for tampering. Quality assurance is maintained throughout the process through testing and documentation or by purchasing from trusted vendors. Updates of equipment or software are purchased or



Code :PL/SMI/16 Version : 02 Date : 30/04/2019 Page : 50 / 71

CL: PU

developed in the same manner as the original equipment or software and are installed and tested by trusted and trained personnel.

#### 6.6.2 SECURITY MANAGEMENT CONTROLS

TunTrust has mechanisms in place to control and monitor the security-related configurations of its CA systems. Change control processes consist of change control data entries that are processed, logged and tracked for any security-related changes to CA systems, firewalls, routers, software and other access controls. In this manner, TunTrust verifies whether a major change to the system has been properly evaluated for risk mitigation and authorized by management.

#### 6.6.3 LIFE CYCLE SECURITY CONTROLS

No Stipulation.

#### 6.7 NETWORK SECURITY CONTROLS

TunTrust CA system is connected to one internal network and is protected by firewalls, a Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and Network Address Translation for all internal IP addresses. TunTrust 's customer support and vetting workstations are also protected by firewall(s) and only use internal IP addresses.

TunTrust Root CA Keys are kept offline and brought on-line only when necessary to sign Certificate-issuing subordinate CAs or periodic CRLs or OCSP Certificates.

Firewalls and boundary control devices are configured to allow access only by the addresses, ports, protocols and commands required for the trustworthy provision of PKI services by such systems. It is TunTrust 's security policy to block all ports and protocols and open only necessary ports to enable CA functions. All CA equipment is configured with a minimum number of services and all unused network ports and services are disabled. All firewall configurations and changes thereto are documented, authorized and implemented in accordance with change management procedures.

TunTrust CA network configuration is available for review on-site by its auditors and consultants under an appropriate non-disclosure agreement.

# 6.8 TIME-STAMPING

All TunTrust CA components are regularly synchronized with a reliable time service. TunTrust CA uses a GPS source to establish the correct time for:

- Initial validity time of a CA Certificate;
- Revocation of a CA Certificate;
- Posting of CRL updates; and
- Issuance of Subscriber end entity Certificates.

### 7 CERTIFICATE PROFILE



Code :PL/SMI/16 Version : 02 Date : 30/04/2019 Page : 51 / 71

CL: PU

Certificate issued under this CP/CPS conform to the RFC 5280: Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile.

## 7.1 CERTIFICATE PROFILE

TunTrust generates non-sequential Certificate serial numbers greater than zero (0) containing at least 64 bits of output from a CSPRNG.

### 7.1.1 VERSION NUMBER(S)

All TunTrust CA Certificates are X.509 version 3 Certificates.

#### 7.1.2 CERTIFICATE EXTENSIONS

X.509 v3 extensions are supported and used for Certificates profiles as described in Appendix A and Appendix B.

### 7.1.3 ALGORITHM OBJECT IDENTIFIERS

Algorithms OID are conforming to IETF RFC 3279 and RFC 5280.

### 7.1.4 NAME FORMS

Name forms are in the X.500 distinguished name form as implemented in RFC 3739. The content of the Certificate Issuer Distinguished Name field matches the Subject DN of the Issuing CA to support Name chaining as specified in RFC 5280, section 4.1.2.4. TunTrust does not issue certificates that have underscore characters ("\_") in dNSName entries.

#### 7.1.5 NAME CONSTRAINTS

The TunTrust Services CA is technically constrained with restrictions to issue SSL Certificate for domain names under the top level domain ".tn" and owned by entities under the Tunisian Jurisdiction. However, all TunTrust CA are subject for full audit as specified in section 8 of this CP/CPS.

TunTrust Services CA	Permitted:
X509v3 Name Constraints	DNS:tn
	DirName: C = TN
	Excluded:
	IP:0.0.0.0/0.0.0
	IP:0:0:0:0:0:0:0/0:0:0:0:0:0:0

The TunTrust Qualified CA is constraint to prevent issuance of SSL Certificates.

TunTrust Qualified CA	TLS Web Client Authentication, E-mail Protection,
X509v3 Extended Key	Microsoft Smartcardlogin
Usage	

#### 7.1.6 CERTIFICATE POLICY OBJECT IDENTIFIER



Code :PL/SMI/16 Version : 02 Date : 30/04/2019 Page : 52 / 71

CL: PU

Certificate policy object identifiers are used as per RFC 3739. The OIDs used by TunTrust are listed in Section 1.2.

#### 7.1.7 USAGE OF POLICY CONSTRAINTS EXTENSION

Usage of Policy Constraints extension is supported as per RFC 5280.

TunTrust CA follows Section 7.1.6 of CA/B Forum Baseline Requirements.

### 7.1.8 POLICY QUALIFIERS SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS

No stipulation.

#### 7.1.9 Processing Semantics for the Critical Certificate Policies Extension

No stipulation.

#### 7.1.9.1 TUNTRUST CERTIFICATION AUTHORITIES - CERTIFICATES PROFILES

TunTrust CA Certificate profiles description is available in appendix A of this CP/CPS.

#### 7.1.9.2 TUNTRUST END-ENTITY - CERTIFICATES PROFILES

TunTrust end-entity Certificate profiles description is available in appendix B of this CP/CPS.

# 7.2 CRL PROFILE

### 7.2.1 Version Number(s)

The TunTrust CA and its subordinates issue X.509 Version 2 CRLs in accordance with IETF PKIX RFC 5280.

#### 7.2.2 CRL AND CRL ENTRY EXTENSIONS

The issuing CAs and end user Subscriber Certificates include the cRLDistributionPoints extension containing the URL of the location where a Relying Party can obtain a CRL to check the CA Certificate's status. The criticality field of this extension is set to FALSE.

TunTrust CRL Certificate profiles description is available in Appendix C of this CP/CPS.

# 7.3 OCSP PROFILE

The TunTrust OCSP functionality is built according to RFC 6960.

The TunTrust provides uninterrupted on-line Certificate status protocol OCSP support which is a real time Certificate status inquiry. By this service, when appropriate Certificate status inquiries are received, the status of Certificates and additional information as required by the protocol are returned to the inquirer as the response.

#### 7.3.1 VERSION NUMBER



Code :PL/SMI/16 Version : 02 Date : 30/04/2019

Page : 53 / 71 CL: PU

The OCSP service provided by TunTrust supports the v1 protocol version under the "IETF RFC 6960 Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP" document.

#### 7.3.2 OCSP EXTENSIONS

TunTrust OCSP profile description is available as in the naming and profile (published in the repository https://www.tuntrust.tn/repository).

# 8 COMPLIANCE AUDIT AND OTHER ASSESSMENTS

TunTrust operates at all times in compliance to the following:

- A. the applicable laws;
- B. the requirements of this CP/CPS;
- C. the latest version of the Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates of the CA/B Forum; and
- D. the requirements of the then-current Webtrust Principles And Criteria For Certification Authorities –SSL BASELINE WITH NETWORK SECURITY and WEBTRUST PRINCIPLES AND CRITERIA FOR CERTIFICATION AUTHORITIES (latest relevant version).

# **8.1** Frequency or circumstances of assessment

An annual audit is performed by an independent external auditor to assess TunTrust's compliance with standards set forth by the CA/Browser Forum.

More than one compliance audit per year is possible if this is requested by the audited party or is a result of unsatisfactory results of a previous audit.

Material exceptions or deficiencies identified during an audit will result in a determination of actions to be taken. This determination is made by the independent auditor with input from the TunTrust management. TunTrust management is responsible for developing and implementing a corrective action plan.

# 8.2 IDENTITY/QUALIFICATIONS OF ASSESSOR

TunTrust's audit is performed by a Qualified Auditor. A Qualified Auditor means a natural person, Legal Entity, or group of natural persons or Legal Entities that collectively possess the following qualifications and skills:

- Independence from the subject of the audit;
- The ability to conduct an audit that addresses the criteria specified in an Eligible Audit Scheme (see Section 8.1);
- Employs individuals who have proficiency in examining Public Key Infrastructure technology, information security tools and techniques, information technology and security auditing, and the third-party attestation function;
- Bound by law, government regulation, or professional code of ethics; and



Code :PL/SMI/16 Version : 02 Date : 30/04/2019

Page : 54 / 71 CL: PU

 Except in the case of an Internal Government Auditing Agency, maintains Professional Liability/Errors & Assessor's relationship to assessed entity.

## 8.3 Assessor's relationship to assessed entity

TunTrust has selected an auditor/assessor who is completely independent from TunTrust.

## **8.4** Topics covered by assessment

The audit meets the requirements of the audit schemes highlighted in Section 8 under which the assessment is being made. These requirements may vary as audit schemes are updated. An audit scheme is applicable to TunTrust in the year following the adoption of the updated scheme.

### **8.5** ACTIONS TAKEN AS A RESULT OF DEFICIENCY

With respect to compliance audits of TunTrust's operations, significant exceptions or deficiencies identified during the compliance audit will result in a determination of actions to be taken. This determination is made by TunTrust management with input from the auditor. If exceptions or deficiencies are identified, TunTrust management is responsible for developing and implementing a corrective action plan. If TunTrust determines that such exceptions or deficiencies pose an immediate threat to the security or integrity of the PKI, a corrective action plan will be developed within 30 days and implemented within a commercially reasonable period of time. For less serious exceptions or deficiencies, TunTrust management will evaluate the significance of such issues and determine the appropriate course of action.

# **8.6** COMMUNICATION OF RESULTS

Results of the audit are reported to the Policy Authority for analysis and resolution of any deficiency through a subsequent corrective action plan. The results could also be made available to any other appropriate entities that may be entitled to a copy of the results by law, regulation, or agreement. Copies of TunTrust's audit reports can be found at: https://www.tuntrust.tn/repository/

## 8.7 SELF-AUDITS

During the period in which TunTrust issues Certificates, TunTrust monitors adherence to this CP/CPS and the CA/B Forum requirements and strictly control its service quality by performing self audits on at least a quarterly basis against a randomly selected sample of the greater of one Certificate or at least three percent of the Certificates issued by it during the period commencing immediately after the previous self-audit sample was taken.

# 9 OTHER BUSINESS AND LEGAL MATTERS



Code :PL/SMI/16 Version : 02 Date : 30/04/2019

Page : 55 / 71 CL: PU

## **9.1 FEES**

TunTrust provides a price list for certification and registration services published on the website www.tuntrust.tn.

## 9.1.1 CERTIFICATE ISSUANCE OR RENEWAL FEES

TunTrust charges fees for issuing and renewal of Certificates according to the respective price list published on their website www.tuntrust.tn or made available upon request.

The update of the fees goes through the board of TunTrust. After a favorable opinion, TunTrust forwards the proposal to the Ministry for approval.

Before the implementation of the new fees, TunTrust commits to notify its customers and partners in a period of time of at least one month of the effective date of these new fees.

#### 9.1.2 CERTIFICATE ACCESSFEES

TunTrust does not charge fees for access to its Certificate databases.

#### 9.1.3 REVOCATION OR STATUS INFORMATION ACCESSFEES

TunTrust does not charge a Certificate revocation fee or a fee for checking the validity status of an issued Certificate using a CRL. TunTrust does not charge a fee for providing Certificate status information via OCSP.

### 9.1.4 FEES FOR OTHER SERVICES

TunTrust may charge for other additional services such as time stamping.

#### 9.1.5 REFUND POLICY

TunTrust does not refund the fees of Certificates.

# 9.2 FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY

# 9.2.1 INSURANCE COVERAGE

TunTrust encourages customers, Subscribers, End-Entities, Relying Parties, and all other entities to maintain adequate insurance to protect against errors and omissions, professional liability, and general liability. TunTrust currently maintains commercially reasonable insurance.

## 9.2.2 OTHER ASSETS

No Stipulation.

# 9.2.3 Insurance or warranty coverage for end-entities

No Stipulation.



Code :PL/SMI/16 Version : 02 Date : 30/04/2019 Page : 56 / 71

CL: PU

### 9.3 CONFIDENTIALITY OF BUSINESS INFORMATION

#### 9.3.1 Scope of confidential information

The following items are classified as being confidential information and therefore are subject to reasonable care and attention by TunTrust staff including operators and administrators:

- Personal Information as detailed in Section 9.4;
- Audit logs from CA and RA systems;
- Activation data used to active CA Private Keys as detailed in Section 6.4;
- Internal TunTrust business process documentation including Disaster Recovery Plan (DRP) and Business Continuity Procedures (BCP); and
- Audit Reports from an independent auditor as detailed in Section 8.0.

#### 9.3.2 Information not within the scope of confidential information

The following are not considered confidential:

- Certificates;
- Certificate revocation;
- Certificate status; and
- TunTrust repositories and their contents.

### 9.3.3 RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION

TunTrust protects and secures confidential information from disclosure.

# 9.4 PRIVACY OF PERSONAL INFORMATION

#### 9.4.1 PRIVACY PLAN

TunTrust protects personal information in accordance with the Tunisian law N° 2004-63 of July 27th, 2004 on the protection of personal data and TunTrust internal document.

TunTrust makes available to Subscribers and Relying Parties its Privacy Policy on the website <a href="https://www.tuntrust.tn/repository">https://www.tuntrust.tn/repository</a>.

#### 9.4.2 INFORMATION TREATED AS PRIVATE



Code :PL/SMI/16 Version : 02 Date : 30/04/2019

Page : 57 / 71 CL: PU

TunTrust treats all personal information about an individual that is not publicly available in the contents of a Certificate or CRL as private information. TunTrust protects private information using appropriate safeguards and a reasonable degree of care.

#### 9.4.3 INFORMATION NOT DEEMED PRIVATE

Private information does not include Certificates, CRLs, or their contents.

### 9.4.4 RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT PRIVATE INFORMATION

TunTrust employees and contractors are expected to handle personal information in strict confidence and meet the requirements of Tunisia law concerning the protection of personal data. All sensitive information is securely stored and protected against accidental disclosure.

# 9.4.5 NOTICE AND CONSENT TO USE PRIVATE INFORMATION

Personal information obtained from an Applicant during the application or identity verification process is considered private information if the information is not included in a Certificate. TunTrust will only use private information after obtaining the subject's consent or as required by applicable law or regulation. All Subscribers must consent to the global transfer and publication of any personal data contained in a Certificate.

#### 9.4.6 DISCLOSURE PURSUANT TO JUDICIAL OR ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS

TunTrust will only release or disclose private information on judicial or other authoritative order.

### 9.4.7 OTHER INFORMATION DISCLOSURE CIRCUMSTANCES

No Stipulation.

# 9.5 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS

TunTrust does not knowingly violate the intellectual property rights of third parties. Public and Private Keys remain the property of Subscribers who legitimately hold them. TunTrust retains ownership of Certificates; however, it grants permission to reproduce and distribute Certificates on a non-exclusive, royalty free basis, provided that they are reproduced and distributed in full.

# 9.6 REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES

### 9.6.1 CA REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES

By issuing a Certificate, TunTrust makes the Certificate warranties listed herein to the following Certificate Beneficiaries:

- The Subscriber that is a party to the Subscriber Agreement
- All Application Software Suppliers with whom TunTrust has entered into a contract for inclusion of its Root Certificate in software distributed by such Application Software Supplier; and



Code :PL/SMI/16 Version : 02 Date : 30/04/2019

Page : 58 / 71 CL: PU

All Relying Parties who reasonably rely on a Valid Certificate.

TunTrust represents and warrants to the Certificate Beneficiaries that, during the period when the Certificate is valid, TunTrust has complied with these Requirements and its Certificate Policy and/or Certification Practice Statement in issuing and managing the Certificate.

The Certificate Warranties specifically include, but are not limited to, the following:

- 1. **Right to Use Domain Name**: That, at the time of issuance, TunTrust (i) implemented a procedure for verifying that the Applicant either had the right to use, or had control of, the Domain Name(s) listed in the Certificate's subject field and subjectAltName extension (or, only in the case of Domain Names, was delegated such right or control by someone who had such right to use or control); (ii) followed the procedure when issuing the Certificate; and (iii) accurately described the procedure in TunTrust's Certificate Policy and/or Certification Practice Statement;
- 2. **Authorization for Certificate:** That, at the time of issuance, TunTrust (i) implemented a procedure for verifying that the Subject authorized the issuance of the Certificate and that the Applicant Representative is authorized to request the Certificate on behalf of the Subject; (ii) followed the procedure when issuing the Certificate; and (iii) accurately described the procedure in TunTrust's Certificate Policy and/or Certification Practice Statement;
- 3. Accuracy of Information: That, at the time of issuance, TunTrust (i) implemented a procedure for verifying the accuracy of all of the information contained in the Certificate (with the exception of the subject:organizationalUnitName attribute); (ii) followed the procedure when issuing the Certificate; and (iii) accurately described the procedure in TunTrust's Certificate Policy and/or Certification Practice Statement;
- 4. **No Misleading Information:** That, at the time of issuance, TunTrust (i) implemented a procedure for reducing the likelihood that the information contained in the Certificate's subject:organizationalUnitName attribute would be misleading; (ii) followed the procedure when issuing the Certificate; and (iii) accurately described the procedure in TunTrust's Certificate Policy and/or Certification Practice Statement;
- 5. **Identity of Applicant:** That, if the Certificate contains Subject Identity Information, TunTrust (i) implemented a procedure to verify the identity of the Applicant in accordance with Sections 3.2 and 11.2; (ii) followed the procedure when issuing the Certificate; and (iii) accurately described the procedure in TunTrust's Certificate Policy and/or Certification Practice Statement;
- 6. **Subscriber Agreement:** That, if TunTrust and Subscriber are not Affiliated, the Subscriber and TunTrust are parties to a legally valid and enforceable Subscriber Agreement that satisfies these Requirements, or, if TunTrust and Subscriber are the same entity or are Affiliated, the Applicant Representative acknowledged the Terms of Use;
- 7. **Status:** That TunTrust maintains a 24 x 7 publicly-accessible Repository with current information regarding the status (valid or revoked) of all unexpired Certificates; and



Code :PL/SMI/16 Version : 02 Date : 30/04/2019 Page : 59 / 71

CL: PU

8. **Revocation:** That TunTrust will revoke the Certificate for any of the reasons specified in these Requirements.

#### 9.6.2 RA REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES

TunTrust RA represents that:

- 1. Information provided by TunTrust RA does not contain any false or misleading information,
- 2. Translations performed by TunTrust RA are an accurate translation of the original information, and
- 3. All Certificates requested by TunTrust RA meet the requirements of the applicable CP/CPS.

#### 9.6.3 SUBSCRIBER REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES

TunTrust requires, as part of the Subscriber Agreement, that the Applicant make the commitments and warranties in this section for the benefit of TunTrust and the Certificate Beneficiaries.

Prior to the issuance of a Certificate, TunTrust obtains, for the express benefit of TunTrust and the Certificate Beneficiaries, the Applicant's agreement to the Subscriber Agreement with the CA.

TunTrust implements a process to ensure that each Subscriber Agreement is legally enforceable against the Applicant. In either case, the Agreement is applied to the Certificate to be issued pursuant to the Certificate request.

A separate Agreement is used for each Certificate request, or a single Agreement is used to cover multiple future Certificate requests and the resulting Certificates, as long as each Certificate that TunTrust issues to the Applicant is clearly covered by that Subscriber Agreement.

The Subscriber Agreement contains provisions imposing on the Applicant itself (or made by the Applicant on behalf of its principal or agent under a subcontractor or hosting service relationship) the following obligations and warranties:

- Accuracy of Information: An obligation and warranty to provide accurate and complete
  information at all times to TunTrust, both in the Certificate request and as otherwise requested by
  TunTrust in connection with the issuance of the Certificate(s) to be supplied by TunTrust;
- 2. **Protection of Private Key:** An obligation and warranty by the Applicant to take all reasonable measures to assure control of, keep confidential, and properly protect at all times the Private Key that corresponds to the Public Key to be included in the requested Certificate(s) (and any associated activation data or device, e.g. password or token);
- **3.** Acceptance of Certificate: An obligation and warranty that the Subscriber will review and verify the Certificate contents for accuracy;
- 4. **Use of Certificate:** An obligation and warranty to install the Certificate only on servers that are accessible at the subjectAltName(s) listed in the Certificate, and to use the Certificate solely in compliance with all applicable laws and solely in accordance with the Subscriber Agreement;



Code :PL/SMI/16 Version : 02 Date : 30/04/2019 Page : 60 / 71

CL: PU

- 5. **Reporting and Revocation:** An obligation and warranty to: (a) promptly request revocation of the Certificate, and cease using it and its associated Private Key, if there is any actual or suspected misuse or compromise of the Subscriber's Private Key associated with the Public Key included in the Certificate, and (b) promptly request revocation of the Certificate, and cease using it, if any information in the Certificate is or becomes incorrect or inaccurate.
- **6. Termination of Use of Certificate:** An obligation and warranty to promptly cease all use of the Private Key corresponding to the Public Key included in the Certificate upon revocation of that Certificate for reasons of Key Compromise.
- 7. **Responsiveness:** An obligation to respond to TunTrust's instructions concerning Key Compromise or Certificate misuse within a specified time period.
- 8. **Acknowledgment and Acceptance:** An acknowledgment and acceptance that TunTrust is entitled to revoke the Certificate immediately if the Applicant were to violate the terms of the Subscriber Agreement or if TunTrust discovers that the Certificate is being used to enable criminal activities such as phishing attacks, fraud, or the distribution of malware.

#### 9.6.4 Relying party representations and warranties

Each Relying Party represents that, prior to relying on a TunTrust Certificate, it:

- Obtained sufficient knowledge on the use of digital Certificates and PKI,
- Studied the applicable limitations on the usage of Certificates and agrees to TunTrust's limitations on liability related to the use of Certificates,
- Has read, understands, and agrees to this CP/CPS,
- Verified both the TunTrust Certificate and the Certificates in the Certificate chain using the relevant CRL or OCSP.
- Will not use a TunTrust Certificate if the Certificate has expired or been revoked, and
- Will take all reasonable steps to minimize the risk associated with relying on a TunTrust Certificate after considering:
  - applicable law and the legal requirements for identification of a party, protection of the confidentiality or privacy of information, and enforceability of the transaction;
  - the intended use of the Certificate as listed in the Certificate or this CP/CPS,
  - the data listed in the Certificate,
  - the potential loss or damage that would be caused by an erroneous identification or a loss of confidentiality or privacy of information in the application, transaction, or communication,
  - the Relying Party's previous course of dealing with the Subscriber,
  - the Relying Party's understanding of trade, including experience with computer-based methods of trade, and
  - any other indication of reliability or unreliability pertaining to the Subscriber and/or the application, communication, or transaction.

Any unauthorized reliance on a Certificate is at a party's own risk.

# 9.6.5 REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES OF OTHER PARTICIPANTS

No stipulation.

# 9.7 DISCLAIMERS OF WARRANTIES



Code :PL/SMI/16 Version : 02 Date : 30/04/2019

Page : 61 / 71 CL: PU

To the extent permitted by applicable law, this CP/CPS, the Certificate Holder Agreement, the Relying Party Agreement, the Issuing CA Agreement, the Registration Authority Agreement and any other contractual documentation applicable within the TunTrust PKI shall disclaim TunTrust possible warranties, including any warranty of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose.

To the extent permitted by applicable law, TunTrust makes no express or implied representations or warranties pursuant to this CP/CPS. TunTrust expressly disclaims any and all express or implied warranties of any type to any person, including any implied warranty of title, non infringement, merchantability, or fitness for a particular purpose.

## 9.8 LIMITATIONS OF LIABILITY

TunTrust is only liable for damages which are the result of its failure to comply with this CP/CPS and which were provoked deliberately or wantonly negligent.

TunTrust is not in any event liable for any loss of profits, indirect and consequential damages, or loss of data, to the extent permitted by applicable law. TunTrust is not liable for any damages resulting from infringements by the Subscriber or the Relying Party on the applicable terms and conditions.

TunTrust is not in any event liable for damages that result from force major events as detailed in section 9.15.5. TunTrust takes commercially reasonable measures to mitigate the effects of force major in due time. Any damages resulting of any delay caused by force major will not be covered by TunTrust.

The Subscriber is liable to TunTrust and Relying Parties for any damages resulting from misuse, willful misconduct, failure to meet regulatory obligations, or noncompliance with other provisions for using the Certificate.

### 9.9 INDEMNITIES

Notwithstanding any limitations on its liability to Subscriber and Relying Parties, TunTrust acknowledges that the Application Software Suppliers who have a Root Certificate distribution agreement in place with TunTrust do not assume any obligation or potential liability of TunTrust under this CP/CPs or that otherwise might exist because of the issuance or maintenance of Certificates or reliance thereon by Relying Parties or others. TunTrust shall defend, indemnify, and hold harmless each Application Software Supplier for any and all claims, damages, and losses suffered by such Application Software Supplier related to a Certificate issued by TunTrust, regardless of the cause of action or legal theory involved. This does not apply, however, to any claim, damages, or loss suffered by such Application Software Supplier related to a Certificate issued by TunTrust where such claim, damage, or loss was directly caused by such Application Software Supplier's software displaying as not trustworthy a Certificate that is still valid, or displaying as trustworthy: (1) a Certificate that has expired, or (2) a Certificate that has been revoked (but only in cases where the revocation status is currently available from TunTrust online, and the application software either failed to check such status or ignored an indication of revoked status).

Additional indemnity provisions and obligations are contained within relevant contractual documentation.



Code :PL/SMI/16 Version : 02 Date : 30/04/2019 Page : 62 / 71

CL: PU

# 9.10 TERM AND TERMINATION

#### 9.10.1 TERM

This CP/CPS, and any amendments thereto, are effective upon publication in TunTrust's Repository.

### 9.10.2 TERMINATION

This CP/CPS, as may be amended from time to time, is effective until replace by a new version, which shall be published in TunTrust's Repository.

#### 9.10.3 EFFECTOFTERMINATIONANDSURVIVAL

Upon Termination of this CP/CPS, customers, Subscribers, and Relying Parties are bound by its terms for all Certificates issued, while it's effective, for the remainder of the validity periods of such Certificates.

#### 9.11 INDIVIDUAL NOTICES AND COMMUNICATIONS WITH PARTICIPANTS

TunTrust, Subscribers, Applicants, Relying Parties and other participants will use commercially reasonable methods to communicate with each other.

# 9.12 AMENDMENTS

#### 9.12.1 PROCEDURE FOR AMENDMENT

Changes to this CP/CPS are indicated by appropriate numbering.

### 9.12.2 NOTIFICATION MECHANISM AND PERIOD

Updates, amendments, and new version of TunTrust's CP/CPS shall be posted in TunTrust's repository. Such publication shall serve as notice to all relevant entities.

#### 9.12.3 CIRCUMSTANCESUNDERWHICHOIDMUSTBECHANGED

If TunTrust's Board of Directors determines that a change is necessary in the object identifier corresponding to a Certificate policy, the amendment shall contain new object identifiers for the Certificate policies corresponding to each such Certificate. Otherwise, amendments shall not require a change in Certificate policy object identifier.

#### 9.13 DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROVISIONS



Code :PL/SMI/16 Version : 02 Date : 30/04/2019

Page : 63 / 71 CL: PU

Parties are required to notify TunTrust and attempt to resolve disputes directly with TunTrust before resorting to any dispute resolution mechanism, including adjudication or any type of alternative dispute resolution.

#### 9.14 GOVERNING LAW

This CP/CPS is governed, construed and interpreted in accordance with the laws of Tunisia. This choice of law is made to ensure uniform interpretation of this CP/CPS, regardless of the place of residence or place of use of TunTrust Certificates or other products and services. The law of Tunisia applies also to all TunTrust commercial or contractual relationships in which this CP/CPS may apply or quoted implicitly or explicitly in relation to TunTrust products and services where TunTrust acts as a provider, supplier, beneficiary receiver or otherwise.

Each party, including TunTrust partners, Subscribers and Relying Parties, irrevocably submit to the jurisdiction of the district courts of Ariana, Tunisia.

#### 9.15 COMPLIANCE WITH APPLICABLE LAW

TunTrust complies with applicable laws of Tunisia.

#### 9.16 MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

#### 9.16.1 ENTIRE AGREEMENT

This CP/CPS and the applicable Subscriber Terms and Conditions represent the entire agreement between any Subscriber or Relying Party and TunTrust and shall supersede any and all prior understandings and representations pertaining to its subject matter. In the event, however, of a conflict between this CP/CPS and any other express agreement between a Subscriber or Relying Party with TunTrust with respect to a Certificate, including but not limited to a Subscriber Terms and Conditions, such other agreement shall take precedence.

#### 9.16.2 ASSIGNMENT

Entities operating under this CP/CPS cannot assign their rights or obligations without the prior written consent of TunTrust.

#### 9.16.3 SEVERABILITY

If any provision of this CP/CPS, including limitation of liability clauses, is found to be invalid or unenforceable, the remainder of this CP/CPS will be interpreted in such manner as to affect the original intention of the parties.

Each and every provision of this CP/CPS that provides for a limitation of liability is intended to be severable and independent of any other provision and is to be enforced as such.



Code :PL/SMI/16 Version : 02 Date : 30/04/2019 Page : 64 / 71

CL: PU

# 9.16.4 ENFORCEMENT (ATTORNEYS' FEES AND WAIVER OF RIGHTS)

The waiver or failure to exercise any right provided for in this CP/CPS shall not be deemed a waiver of any further or future right under this CP/CPS.

### 9.16.5 FORCE MAJEURE

TunTrust is not liable for any delay or failure to perform an obligation under this CP/CPS to the extent that the delay or failure is caused by an occurrence beyond TunTrust's reasonable control. The operation of the Internet is beyond TunTrust's reasonable control.

## 9.17 OTHER PROVISIONS

The present CP/CPS does not state any conditions in this respect.



Code :PL/SMI/16 Version : 02 Date : 30/04/2019 Page : 65 / 71

CL: PU

# **APPENDIX A**

# **TunTrust CA Certificate Profiles**

# 1. TunTrust Root CA

The following table describes the certificate profile of TunTrust Root CA:

Fields	Critical	Values			
Version		3 (0x2)			
Serial Number		13:02:d5:e2:40:4c:92:46:86:16:67:5d:b4:bb:bb:b2:6b:3e:fc:13			
Signature Algorithm		sha256WithRSAEncryption			
Issuer		C=TN, O=Agence Nationale de Certification Electronique, CN=TunTrust Root CA			
Validity					
Not Before		Apr 26 08:57:56 2019 GMT			
Not After		Apr 26 08:57:56 2044 GMT			
Subject		C=TN, O=Agence Nationale de Certification Electronique, CN=TunTrust Root CA			
Subject Public Key Info					
Public Key Algorithm		rsaEncryption			
RSA Public Key		4096 bit			
Exponent		65537 (0x10001)			
X509v3 extensions					
X509v3 Subject Key Identifier		SHA-1 Hash of Subject public key			
X509v3 Basic Constraints	True	CA: TRUE			
X509v3 Authority Key Identifier		Keyid: 06:9A:9B:1F:53:7D:F1:F5:A4:C8:D3:86:3E:A1:73:59:B4:F7:44:21			
X509v3 Key Usage	True	Certificate Sign, CRL Sign			
Signature Algorithm		sha256WithRSAEncryption			

# 2. TunTrust Qualified CA

The following table describes the certificate profile of TunTrust Qualified CA:

Fields	Critical	Values
Version		3 (0x2)



Code :PL/SMI/16 Version : 02 Date : 30/04/2019 Page : 66 / 71

CL: PU

Serial Number		64:0c:48:27:ee:90:3e:af:b4:d7:3d:b2:79:7a:91:af:c9:85:72:7a					
Signature Algorithm		sha256WithRSAEncryption					
Issuer		C=TN, O=Agence Nationale de Certification Electronique CN=TunTrust Root CA					
Validity							
Not Before		Apr 26 09:49:02 2019 GMT					
Not After		Apr 26 09:49:02 2039 GMT					
Subject		C=TN, O=Agence Nationale de Certification Electronique, CN=TunTrust Qualified CA					
Subject Public Key Info	)						
Public Key Algorithm		rsaEncryption					
RSA Public Key		4096 bit					
Exponent		65537 (0x10001)					
X509v3 extensions							
Authority Information Access		CA Issuers - URI:http://www.tuntrust.tn/pub/TnTrustRootCA.crt OCSP - URI:http://va.tuntrust.tn					
X509v3 Subject Key Identifier		28:6C:72:5F:B0:89:10:9C:8E:10:D6:30:96:9E:8F:FC:FB:9F:74:36					
X509v3 Basic Constraints	True	CA:TRUE, pathlen:0					
X509v3 Authority Key Identifier		Keyid: 06:9A:9B:1F:53:7D:F1:F5:A4:C8:D3:86:3E:A1:73:59:B4:F7:44:21					
X509v3 Certificate Policies		Policy: 2.16.788.1.2.7.1.1.1					
X509 CRL Distribution Points		URI:http://crl.tuntrust.tn/tntrustrootca.crl					
X509v3 Key Usage	True	Certificate Sign, CRL Sign					
X509v3 Extended		TLS Web Client Authentication, E-mail Protection, Microsoft					
Key Usage		Smartcardlogin					
Signature Algorithm		sha256WithRSAEncryption					

# 3. TunTrust Services CA

The following table describes the certificate profile of TunTrust Services CA:

Fields	Critical	Values			
Version		3 (0x2)			
Serial Number		60:1a:7c:2f:60:93:b7:a6:73:da:5f:8c:9c:88:5f:37:a7:58:97:c0			



Code :PL/SMI/16 Version : 02 Date : 30/04/2019 Page : 67 / 71

CL: PU

		T					
Signature Algorithm		sha256WithRSAEncryption					
Issuer		C=TN, O=Agence Nationale de Certification Electronique, CN=TunTrust Root CA					
Validity							
Not Before		Apr 26 10:23:31 2019 GMT					
Not After		Apr 26 10:23:31 2039 GMT					
Subject		C=TN, O=Agence Nationale de Certification Electronique, CN=TunTrust Services CA					
Subject Public Key Info							
Public Key Algorithm		rsaEncryption					
RSA Public Key		4096 bit					
Exponent		65537 (0x10001)					
X509v3 extensions							
X509v3 Name	True	Permitted:					
Constraints		DNS:tn					
		DirName: C = TN  Excluded:  IP:0.0.0.0/0.0.0.0  IP:0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0					
Authority Information Access		CA Issuers - URI:http://www.tuntrust.tn/pub/TnTrustRootCA.crt OCSP - URI:http://va.tuntrust.tn					
X509v3 Subject Key Identifier		9F:25:17:CE:6F:90:AB:61:2F:C1:47:A9:E0:2F:99:13:5D:FA:23:39					
X509v3 Basic Constraints	True	CA: TRUE, pathlen:0					
X509v3 Authority Key Identifier		Keyid: 06:9A:9B:1F:53:7D:F1:F5:A4:C8:D3:86:3E:A1:73:59:B4:F7:44:21					
X509v3 Certificate Policies		Policy: 2.16.788.1.2.7.1.1.2					
X509 CRL Distribution Points		URI:http://crl.tuntrust.tn/tntrustrootca.crl					
X509v3 Key Usage	True	Certificate Sign, CRL Sign					
X509v3 Extended Key Usage		TLS Web Server Authentication, TLS Web Client Authentication					
Signature Algorithm		sha256WithRSAEncryption					
		i , ,					



Code :PL/SMI/16 Version : 02 Date : 30/04/2019 Page : 68 / 71

CL: PU

# **APPENDIX B**

# **TunTrust PKI End-entity profiles**

The following table provides the description of the fields for TunTrust OVCP SSL Certificates issued under TunTrust Services CA:

Base Profile	Included	Critical	O/M <sup>1</sup>	CO <sup>2</sup>	Values
Data:					
Version	Х	False	М	S	3 (0x2)
Serial Number	X	False	М	FDV	Validated on duplicates
Signature Algorithm	Х	False	М	S	SHA256 with RSA Encryption
Issuer	Х	False	M	S	C=TN, O=Agence Nationale de Certification Electronique, CN=Tuntrust Services CA
Validity					
Not Before	Х	False	М	D	Certificate generation process date/time
Not After	Х	False	М	D	Certificate generation process date/time + 365 days or 730 days
Subject :					
C, countryName	Х	False	М	S	TN
L, localityName	Х	False	М	D	Location in which the company's registered office is established.
O, OrganizationName	Х	False	M	D	Contains the full registered name of the organization as listed in the official records of the Incorporating or Registration Agency in the Subject's Jurisdiction of Incorporation or Registration or as otherwise verified by the CA.
serialNumber	Х	False	M	D	Serial Number as constructed by TunTrust RA

\_

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>O/M: O = Optional, M = Mandatory.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> CO = Content: S = Static, D = Dynamic, F = Formatted by CA, V = Validated by CA.



Code :PL/SMI/16 Version : 02 Date : 30/04/2019 Page : 69 / 71

CL: PU

CN, commonName	Х	False	0	D	FQDN (Fully Qualified Domain Name) of application/server – Exact and full URL for a Web Server or unique name of server.
Subject Public Key Info:					
Public Key Algorithm	Х	False	М	S	rsaEncryption
RSA Public Key	Х	False	М	S	(2048 bit)
Modulus (2048 bit)	Χ	False	М	S	
Exponenr	Х	False	М	S	65537 (0x10001)
X509v3 extensions					
Authority Information Access	Х	False	M	S	CA Issuers - URI:http://www.tuntrust.tn/pub/TunTrustService sCA.crt OCSP - URI:http://va.tuntrust.tn
X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:	Х	False	М	D	This extension identifies the public key being certified.
X509v3 Basic Constraints:	Χ	True	М	S	CA:False
X509v3 Authority Key Identifier	Х	False	М	S	keyid:9F:25:17:CE:6F:90:AB:61:2F:C1:47:A9:E0:2F: 99:13:5D:FA:23:39
X509v3 Certificate Policies	Х	False	M	S	Policy: 2.16.788.1.2.7.1.1.2.1 Policy: 0.4.0.2042.1.7 Policy: 2.23.140.1.2.2
X509v3 CRL Distribution Points	Χ	False	М	S	URI:http://crl.tuntrust.tn/tuntrustservicesca.crl
X506v3 Key Usage	Χ	True	М	S	Digital Signature, Key Encipherment
X509v3 Extended Key Usage	Χ	False	М	S	TLS Web Client Authentication, TLS Web Server Authentication
X509v3 Subject alternative Name:	Х	False	M	D	DNS: FQDN (Fully Qualified Domain Name) of application/server – Exact and full URL for a Web Server or unique name of server.



Code :PL/SMI/16 Version : 02 Date : 30/04/2019 Page : 70 / 71

CL: PU

# APPENDIX C Profiles of the CRL of TunTrust CA

# 1. TunTrust Root CA CRL

The following table describes the CRL profile of TunTrust Root CA:

Field	Value	
Version	2 (0x1)	
Signature Algorithm	sha256WithRSAEncryption	
Issuer	/CN=TunTrust Root CA/O=Agence Nationale de Certification	
	Electronique/C=TN	
Last Update	CRL generation process date/time.	
Next Update	CRL generation process date/time + 365 days	
CRL extensions		
X509v3 Authority Key Identifier	6:9A:9B:1F:53:7D:F1:F5:A4:C8:D3:86:3E:A1:73:59:B4:F7:44:21	
X509v3 CRL Number	A monotonically increasing sequence number	
Revoked Certificates:		
Serial Number:	Serial number of the revoked certificate	
Revocation Date	Date and time of the revocation	
Signature Algorithm	sha256WithRSAEncryption	

# 2. TunTrust Qualified CA CRL

The following table describes the CRL profile of TunTrust Qualified CA:

Field	Value	
Version	2 (0x1)	
Signature Algorithm	sha256WithRSAEncryption	
Issuer	/CN=TunTrust Qualified CA/O=Agence Nationale de	
	Certification Electronique/C=TN	
Last Update	CRL generation process date/time.	
Next Update	CRL generation process date/time + 6 days	
CRL extensions		
X509v3 Authority Key Identifier	28:6C:72:5F:B0:89:10:9C:8E:10:D6:30:96:9E:8F:FC:FB:9F:74:36	
X509v3 CRL Number	A monotonically increasing sequence number	
Revoked Certificates:		
Serial Number:	Serial number of the revoked certificate	
Revocation Date	Date and time of the revocation	
Signature Algorithm	sha256WithRSAEncryption	



Code :PL/SMI/16 Version : 02 Date : 30/04/2019

Page : 71 / 71 CL: PU

# 3. TunTrust Services CA CRL

The following table describes the CRL profile of TunTrust Services CA:

Field	Value
Version	2 (0x1)
Signature Algorithm	sha256WithRSAEncryption
Issuer	/CN=TunTrust Services CA/O=Agence Nationale de Certification Electronique/C=TN
Last Update	CRL generation process date/time.
Next Update	CRL generation process date/time + 6 days
CRL extensions	
X509v3 Authority Key Identifier	9F:25:17:CE:6F:90:AB:61:2F:C1:47:A9:E0:2F:99:13:5D:FA:23:39
X509v3 CRL Number	A monotonically increasing sequence number
Revoked Certificates:	
Serial Number:	Serial number of the revoked certificate
Revocation Date	Date and time of the revocation
Signature Algorithm	sha256WithRSAEncryption